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POL 313
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The Presidency The President and National Security Policy
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Thus, the national security policy arena is a fine place to test the "presidential power paradigm"! (Remember the "Rally Around the President in Time of Crisis" and "Our President Right or Wrong" indices discussed earlier in the semester?) Foreign policy is also an area in which the institutional connection favors the president the national security policy area, we need to explore a brief history of recent trends and issues in the national security area. Post-World War II is dominated by "the containment of communism" from the end of WWII to Collapse of Communism U.S. military actions in Korean peninsula, Vietnam U.S. policy in Asia, the Middle East, and Central and South America trade and international economic policy
Issues Presidential Powers in National Security Policy The President generally conducts foreign policy to the extent that negotiations and communications with other governments are a virtual presidential monopoly. However, Congress retains the ability to substantially influence the substance of foreign and defense policy since presidential policies are dependent upon the Congress for implementing legislation and appropriations. 2) have established their authority; and 3) are meeting their international obligations US refused to recognize the communist government of Russia after the revolution of 1917-18; US was first country to recognize Israel in 1948; US doesn't recognize PRC in 1949; US recognizes the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1991; US broke relations with Iran following hostage taking in 1979. Congress has attempted only minimally to voice its disapproval of executive agreements. The Chase-Zablocki Act of 1972 requires that the Congress be notified of all executive agreements. Congress' ability to influence executive agreements extends only to the extent that they are not "self-executing" and thus need Congressional action in the form of implementing legislation or appropriations President's can also influence national security policy by "reinterpreting" treaties. In 1985, Reagan "reinterpreted the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to accommodate the development of "star wars" despite objections by the Congress and the Soviet Union. C) Appointments Presidential appointments: Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Director of the CIA Assistant for National Security Affairs With these appointments the president indicates the direction and orientation of US foreign and defense policies. It can be argued that you can tell something about the President's "feeling" for foreign policy (and perhaps their "character") by seeing who is appointed Secretary of State. A well-known opinionated person generally means that the President will rely heavily on them. A relative unknown means the President wants to be the major player in national security affairs. (Reagan and Haig; Clinton and Allbright; Nixon's replacement of Wm. Rogers with Kissinger). It is also argued that you can tell about the President and defense by looking at who is appointed Secretary of Defense. Kennedy's choice of Robert McNamara (determination to make military more efficient); Nixon's choice of Rep. Melvin Laird (more influence with Congress); Reagan appointment of Caspar Weinberger (mixed message of cost-cutter Weinberger vs. Reagan defense expenditures); Clinton's appointment of Cohen (a Republican from Maine--bipartisan foreign policy??) CIA director appointments can be controversial. Since CIA gathers "intelligence" this broad grant can become political in 2 ways: 1) the problem of "domestic intelligence" and 2) the problem when something unexpected happens (failure to recognize Iranian revolution's early stages; Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, etc.). CIA directors can be professionals or politicians. Reagan's appointment of Casey and the Inran-Contra affair (Casey dies before congressional investigation into the affair). The appointment of the national security assistant in not subject to Senate approval. D) the use of military force President as commander-in-chief vs. Article I's grant of powers to Congress in the area of military matters is substantial, including the ability to declare war In theory then, the two branches "share" powers", historically the reality is quite different The reality is that, over time, there has been a great expansion of presidential power at the expense of Congressional power--------the "war powers" battleground The war powers of the president are sweeping and have their basis in the Constitution, statutory delegations of power to the President by Congress, and in judicial interpretation The constitutional foundation of presidential war power was laid by Lincoln during the Civil War when he married the commander-in-chief clause to the "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" clause (remember Pious lecture?!). He used the resulting powers to justify a wide range of presidential actions such as: 1) activating state militias; 2) spending appropriated funds for unauthorized purposes; 3) suspending the writ of habeus corpus; 4) blockading Confederate ports The Supreme Court upheld the legality of the blockade in the Prize Cases which declared that the president had a duty to defend the nation by appropriate means, including military action. Also, the Court's refusal to overturn any of Lincoln's actions until after the end of the war set a precedent of judicial deference that would be followed in future wars (for example, the incarceration of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the War Labor Board with sweeping regulatory power, and FDR demand--and congressional action to repeal the Emergency Price Control Act (and creating of the Office of Price Administration)) 1) in World War I, Congress granted the president power to purchase materials for the war, to prohibit liscences, to censor international communications, to regulate enemy aliens in the United States, and to seize and operate the railroads 2) these powers were expanded during World War II---Lend-Lease Act, for example--and not withdrawn until the National Emergencies Act of 1976 Thus, once war is declared, presidential powers are vast!! Some constitutional scholars have even argued that during war time, the Constitution is suspended!!!!! The president's power to use military force in peacetime or periods of "undeclared war" is less clear. While the Supreme Court has been reticent to rule in this area, Congress has been more willing to to asserts its prerogatives Between WWI and WWII Congress attempted to circumscribe presidential war powers via the Neutrality Acts. Congress's failure to declare and implement a policy of isolationism (and perhaps the isolationist tendency itself) helped to bring on WWII) Following WWII, presidents fashioned an internationalist policy with bipartisan support, based primarily on the notion of the containment of communism, in which it was expected that presidents took the initiative and Congress reviewed (and approved) the actions by passing implementing legislation and appropriations. The most sensitive area was the commitment of US troops to fight abroad---something still debated today!!! The most controversial action to date has been US involvement in Vietnam. Starting with Truman, American presidents made commitments of military aid and advisors to the government of South Vietnam By the end of 1963, the US had 16,000 military advisors there participating in combat although not authorized to do so In August 1964, the US administration reported a confrontation between a US destroyer and a North Vietnamese gunboat in the Gulf of Tonkin At Johnson's request Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which authorized the president to "take all necessary steps including the use of armed force to assist nations belong to SEATO in defense of their freedom" (The resolution passed with only two dissenting votes!) LBJ ordered a huge increase (by 1967 there were 500,000+ troops) in force, the conduct of air raids, etc. Nixon ordered the covert invasion of Cambodia and in Decmeber 1972 the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. To support the war effort after the Congress cut off funds, Nixon impounded funds to further prosecute the war All of these actions were taken without the consent of Congress As the war dragged on, Congressional support (and public support) began to wane Congressional Reassertion During the 1970s Congress attempted to limit the president's ability to dominate national security policy, especially as it related to war. These efforts included: 1) limit presidents ability to wage was; 2) reduce unrestrained use of executive agreements and reassert dominance of treaty as key to international agreements; 3) curb secrecy and covert operations in the conduct of foreign and military affairs The War Powers Resolution of 1973 Web connection to War Powers Resolution President may commit armed forces to combat only in event of a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or national emergency created by an attack on the US or its armed forces. It requires a written report to Congress within 48 of a commitment of forces and the ending of the commitment within 60 days unless authorized by COngress. (Can be extended 30 more days if President certifies to Congress that military conditions require continued use of force to insure troop safety). It also stated that through the use of a concurrent resolution not subject to presidential veto, Congress could order the disengagement after the 60 day period. Through the Bush presidency, presidents filed 24 reports of military actions with Congress. The most prominent---the Mayaguez incident-- was the only one in which the 60 day clock started. All presidents have argued that the resolution is an unconstitutional encroachment on presidential power and have generally circumvented it by not starting the 60 day clock. Bush did this in the invasion of Panama and, more importantly in Iraq. Here Bush notified Congress of his intent to send troops in a letter which he argued was consistent with the intent of the resolution but did not start the clock. During the next 6 months neither Bush nor Congress tried to start the clock. One week prior to the deadline for Iraq to withdraw (6 months after the beginning of the troop build up) Bush asked Congress to pass a joint resolution approving the use of force (passed 52-47 in Senate and 250-183 in House). Bush signed the resolution while still asserting the position that the War Powers Resolution was unconstitutional What is the upshot of this? It is unclear! It is often viewed as a symbolic victory for Congress with no real practical consequences. Others argue that the timetable aspects lend a measure of democratic control to the president's ability to prosecute an undeclared war. Others argue that the language, etc. need to be tightened to further restrain presidents. Still others argue that it has some effect in altering public opinion about presidential actions--they cite as examples--Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and the recent outcry against bombing Iraq as exmples of how presidents have been constrained !---You decide! Heritage Foundation Lecture Gerald Ford Speech on War Powers Resolution and Executive/ Legislative Relation given at U. of Kentucky Gerald Ford Speech on War Powers Resolution at given at U. of Kansas Other interesting connections: US Naval Historical Center list of instances of use of US forces abroad Student electronic presentation on Gulf War
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