The relationship between the two branches of government is inherently strained. This is due to the notions of separation of powers and checks and balances embedded in the Constitution. The cornerstone of the relationship was to be distrust:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist the encroachments of the others...Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. (Federalist 51)
Far from remaining a static balance of distrust however, the "pendulum" has swung back and forth between a more powerful president and a more powerful Congress. Some argue that the "balance" envisioned by the Founding Fathers 200+ years ago is irrelevant today. They argue that the nature of the problems of contemporary society and the contemporary world make the Founder's vision of balance erroneous. Today, they argue, the balance (pendulum) needs to be on the side of a stronger President. That is not necessarily the case however. Events of the past three decades (Watergate, etc.) have made both the Congress and the American people distrustful of strong presidents. And yet.....Americans also want decisive action.
the inability of anyone
to speak for all Congress (or virtually even for their own
party in Congress) while President speaks for "the nation"
A) Congresspersons as electoral entrepreneurs who virtually disregard their political party. The dominance of nonparty sources of funding, the dominant role of constituent service all leads to a lack of party loyalty and discipline.
B) the lack of presidential coattail effects
Defenders say divided government is not that bad. It tends to make
government less "ambitious". They also argue that it is a way for Americans
to create the multiparty coalition governments of parliamentary systems!
(Did you know that American voters were that clever???).
committee and subcommittee systems, lack of party discipline, weak
leaders
through both the formal powers vested in him by the Constitution and the laws and the informal resources available to him the president has legislative powers
Formal powers
1) ability to call special sessions
not very important since Congress is in virtually constant session
now--best example, FDR's first 100 days
2) messages
sate of the union, etc. Media dominance gives president the ability
to attempt to shape the agenda
3) the veto power
After passage of a bill, 3 options are available to a president:
1) sign it into law;
2) veto it
3) take no action (it then becomes law in 10 days
(If Congress adjourns during that 10 day period it does not become
law---the "pocket veto")
| President | reg
veto |
pocket
veto |
total | over-
ridden |
% |
| FDR (33-45) | 372 | 263 | 635 | 9 | 1.4 |
| Truman (45-53) | 191 | 67 | 258 | 12 | 4.7 |
| Eisenhower (53-61) | 79 | 109 | 188 | 2 | 1.1 |
| Kennedy (61-63) | 12 | 9 | 21 | 0 | 0 |
| Johnson (63-69) | 18 | 11 | 29 | 0 | 0 |
| Nixon (69-74) | 26 | 17 | 43 | 7 | 16.3 |
| Ford (74-77) | 49 | 19 | 68 | 12 | 17.6 |
| Carter (77-81) | 13 | 18 | 31 | 2 | 6.5 |
| Reagan (81-89) | 41 | 27 | 68 | 8 | 11.8 |
| Bush (89-92) | 20 | 4 | 24 | 0 | 0 |
The threat of a veto vs. actual veto
How do presidents influence the legislative process? (Ie., rather than shaping the agenda beforehand or vetoing afterward, how do presidents attempt to get the legislation they want?)
1. Indirectly, presidents can:
a) go over the head of Congress in an attempt to get the public to
pressure Congress to pass the legislation the President wants. This often
happens in "divided government"
b) marshall interest group forces to apply leverage to Congress
2. Directly, the President can employ:
a) favors (easy to do for a small number but impossible when vast
numbers of votes are needed)
b) attempt to manage the whole process through congressional liason
staff (easier to do in "unified rather than divided government")
Categories of Presidential-Congressional Relations Strategies:
1) bargaining (all)
2) armtwisting (LBJ was the archetypal armtwister--embarassment,
threats, reprisals)
3) confrontation (Nixon)
4) detachment (Eisenhower)
Passive-presidents emphasize detachment and bargaining. While active-positive
presidents tend to employ all of these strategies as the situation demands
whereas active-negatives tend to focus on armtwisting and confrontation.
Contextual Factors which explain Presidential-Congressional Relations
Peterson identifies four contextual factors which influence presidential-congressonal relations:
1) the "pure context"--includes the "institutional properties" of the Congress itself, political parties, and interest groups--President has no control over theses!;
2) the "malleable context"--the dynamic political and economic conditions--the President has some influence but no control;
3) the "policy context"--President has a great deal (but not full control) of control over the policies that will be priorities through agenda setting, controversial vs. non-controversial policy suggestions, choice of options, etc.;
4) the "individual context"-- the President's personal attributes
and administrative choices which influence and distinguish his administration