PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS
Entry of Plea and Initial Negotiation
Following arrest, indictment, or information, the defendant must enter a plea, or answer, to the charge or charges emanating from the prosecution. The proceeding is frequently known as an arraignment, or initial appearance, but in some jurisdictions may be called a preliminary hearing. The charges are read to the defendant who receives a copy of the indictment or information. The defendant will generally be required to plead guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere. Where the defendant refuses to enter a plea or stands mute, the judge or magistrate will enter plea of not guilty.
Plea bargains offered by the prosecution and accepted by the defendant when voluntarily and intelligently made by an accused have been approved by the Supreme Court and are not normally subject to later collateral attack. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court detailed the applicable standard for a negotiated plea:
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutors business (e.g., bribes)"
Waiving other Constitutional Rights
Since a plea of guilty involves a waiver of numerous important constitutional rights, courts normally require the defendant to have the benefit of counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is, of course, a waivable right and is not necessarily an absolute prerequisite to the acceptance of a valid guilty plea. Among the rights which a criminal defendant waives by entering a guilty plea are the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, the Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the adverse witnesses, the right to complain about any alleged Fourth Amendment violations, the right to challenge the constitutionality of the composition or procedures of the grand jury, the right to compel testimony from witnesses, and in most circumstances, the right of appeal. However, it should by stressed that an entry of a guilty plea does not foreclose all possible avenues of collateral attack. Generally, a guilty plea does not waive the right to complaint about lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Sixth Amendment allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, and matters specifically reserved for appeal at the time of the entry of the guilty plea.
The legal effect of a voluntary and intelligently-made guilty plea presumes a final and complete admission of each and every material allegation contained within the indictment or information. Upon entry of plea, no triable issues remain for decision; it only remains for the court to determine the appropriate sentence and confer its imposition.
For a variety of reasons, a defendant may elect to enter a plea of nolo contendere, or no contest. In most jurisdictions, this plea possesses most of the attributes of a guilty plea and has the same legal consequences in the criminal contest. The nolo contendere plea, in contrast to a guilty plea, cannot be used as a sword against the defendant in the event that civil litigation arises from the facts giving rise to the criminal accusations. Analyzed more closely, this plea, though not an admission of guilt, constitutes an admission of the facts alleged in the indictment, information or complaint.
Practice for Accepting a Guilty Plea
Although all courts will, under the appropriate circumstances, accept a guilty plea tendered by a defendant, the procedures vary between the state and federal courts. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regulates the mode in which a federal court may permit the entry of a guilty plea. The court must personally address the defendant and inform the defendant of various constitutional rights and the statutory effects of a plea of guilty. The judge must explain the penalties involved, including the mandatory minimum and statutory maximum sentence. In situations wherein the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court is required to advise the defendant of this Sixth Amendment right. Further, Rule 11 requires the court to convey to the defendant an understanding that he can persist in a not guilty plea and be tried by a jury with the assistance of counsel. The judge must advise the defendant of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination and of the right to confront and cross-examine the adverse witnesses. Finally, the defendant must understand that the plea extinguishes the right to a trial by jury.
Once the court has been satisfied that the plea was voluntarily made and has not resulted from unconstitutional threats or force, the judge may accept the plea or reject the agreement. If the court accepts the plea of guilty, the judge will inform the defendant that the judgement will reflect the agreement and the negotiated disposition of the case.
The provisions of Rule 11 have been held to be mandatory in nature, necessitating a reversal where the judge failed to address the defendant personally upon the tendering of the guilty plea. The Court in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), held that a failure to personally address the defendant created inherent prejudice requiring the vacation of the guilty plea.
State practice in accepting guilty pleas roughly mirrors the federal procedure largely as a result of Boykin v. Alabama,395 U.S. 238 (1969), This Chapter. In Boykin, the defendant pled guilty upon advice of counsel to five indictments, each carrying a possible capital sentence. The judge, so far as the trial record disclosed, did not personally address the defendant or otherwise converse with him. In addition, the transcript failed to show whether Boykin knew of the possible consequences of his plea. The Court reversed the death sentence imposed in the case and allowed Boykin to withdraw his plea because the record failed to disclose that Boykin entered his plea of guilty in a voluntary and understanding fashion. In effect, the most important aspects of Federal Rule 11 of Criminal Procedure have been adopted by the Court and made applicable to the states.
Although Federal Rule 11(f) requires that the court shall not accept a guilty plea without making sufficient inquiry to demonstrate that a factual basis exists for the plea, the states are not similarly limited. Some states will not accept a guilty plea absent a factual basis, while others permit a defendant to plead guilty and profess innocence. Illustrative of the latter category, Rule 11(c) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits, with some exceptions, the receipt of a guilty plea without any express admission of the facts which underlie the plea. Consistent with the Ohio procedure under Ohio Rule 11, the Court approved the acceptance of a guilty plea in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), This Chapter, in a case wherein the defendant proclaimed his innocence, but desired to plead guilty in order to escape the possibility of capital punishment. The Court noted that other reasons beside the fact of guilt may influence a defendant to plead guilty, but that the decision on how to plead is one which must be made by the defendant.
Although many defendants plead guilty to charges as originally expressed in the indictment or information, others agree to enter a guilty plea to a different crime or, frequently, to a lesser degree of the original crime charged. A prosecutor may offer to ignore other potential crimes if a defendant will plead guilty to the crime charged. As is usually the case, the prosecutor and the defendant receive a benefit in exchange for the negotiated agreement. The government saves the time and expense of a trial with the attendant uncerainties and is guaranteed a certain conviction. The defendant knows, prior to the entry of the plea, that the conviction will be the type and degree to which the parties agreed, that sentence recommendations, if any, will occur as negotiated, and that the other uncertainties normally associated with a criminal trial have been eliminated.
The negotiated plea has become an integral part of our criminal justice system and presently appears to be the lubricant which keeps the criminal courts operating with any efficiency. If all criminal defendants demanded a full trial on the merits, the system would, in all probability collapse of its own weight. On occasion, a defendant may believe that a negotiated plea failed to grant the defendant the benefits to which he or she agreed, which may generate litigation over the terms or enforceability of a plea bargain.
Remedy for Breached Plea Bargain
Concerning a plea bargain wherein the prosecution failed to adhere to the negotiated agreement, the Court in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), This Chapter, upheld the propriety of such bargain and fashioned a remedy for a prosecutorial breach of the agreement. According to the Court, once a guilty plea agreement has been developed between the prosecution and the defense and where the defendant has relied on the agreement by pleading guilty, only two courses of action are open to the government. The defendant must either be granted specific performance of the plea bargain or be allowed to withdraw the plea and plead anew.
While Santobello involved a plea bargain which was partially performed, the situation concerning a totally executory plea bargain which was withdrawn immediately after acceptance was not decided. In Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, (1984), This Chapter, the Court held that merely because a defendant accepted an offer under a plea negotiation, such acceptance did not create any constitutional right to have the agreement specifically enforced. Indeed, in Santobello, the right to specific performance was not guaranteed; the Court offered specific performance as one alternative remedy of two which it proposed. The Santobello Court further noted that where partial performance had been tendered by the entry of the guilty plea, and where the prosecution breached its promise concerning an executed plea agreement, and the defendant has pled guilty, induced by a false promise, a reversal is required. In Mabry, all promises on both sides remained executory, so a withdrawal of the plea offer by the prosecutor deprived the defendant of no constitutional right to which he had a legitimate expectation.
Despite the fact that the government must generally adhere to the terms of any plea bargain once made and partially executed, it may employ somewhat coercive-appearing tactics in order to initially induce the defendant to accept a plea bargain as offered by the prosecution. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,434 U.S. 357 (1978), This Chapter, the prosecutor offered a forgery defendant the opportunity to plead guilty as charged with the provision that the prosecutor would recommend a five-year sentence. The Commonwealth's attorney informed Hayes that the habitual offender statute would be used to impose a life sentence if he did not accept the prosecutor's offer. When Hayes decided to go to trial, the prosecutor procured an indictment under the Commonwealth's habitual offender statute. The Court upheld the habitual offender conviction on the theory that the prosecutor did nothing which was not properly sanctioned by law. The defendant possessed alternatives to trial and simply chose not to avail himself of the opportunity to plead guilty to a specific offense.
Conclusion
In summary, while guilty pleas by defendants may be motivated by a wide variety of reasons, the constitutional consequences of a guilty plea generally involve similar waivers of rights. As a result procedural protections have evolved to insure that defendants are certain of the consequences of entering a plea of guilty. The plea must have been voluntarily and intelligently made, but could have been motivated by a desire to escape the death penalty or to accept a penalty of certain duration. Countless guilty pleas are the result of plea negotiations which, in some instances, may be specifically enforceable as in Santobello, while in other situations may be subject to prosecutorial withdrawal so long as the bargain remains executory.
Plea Bargaining: Defendant Must Understand Effect of Plea
BOYKIN v. ALABAMA, Supreme Court of the United States (1969),395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709
FACTS:
A grand jury indicted defendant for five counts of robbery, offenses for which the death penalty could have been imposed at that time. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). During one of the robberies, the felon's gun discharged in such a fashion to cause injury to a bystander. After his arrest and prior to arraignment, the court appointed counsel to defend him.
Boykin's attorney allowed him to plead guilty to the five capital counts of robbery at the arraignment. According to the record, the trial judge asked no question of the defendant concerning his plea and did not inform Boykin of legal rights to which he was entitled. Boykin remained silent while the plea was being entered.
Since Alabama law required a jury to determine the sentence subsequent to the entry of a guilty plea, the prosecution presented the punishment phase of the case much as it would have done if the actual trial had been held. Defendant's counsel conducted some cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses but did not present any evidence which might have moved the jury away from the death penalty. The court instructed the penalty-phase jury that it could give the defendant from 10 years to death by electrocution. The jury sentenced defendant Boykin to death on each of the five robbery counts.
As in all Alabama death sentence cases, an automatic appeal was taken to the Alabama supreme Court alleging that to execute for common law robbery constituted cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. In the alternative, Boykin contended that the trial court erred when it accepted his guilty plea without determining whether it was entered voluntarily and knowingly. From an adverse ruling by the Alabama Supreme Court, Boykin requested and was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
In order to properly accept a plea of guilty, must the trial judge affirmatively show on the record that the guilty plea was intelligently made and voluntarily and freely given?
HELD: Yes.
RATIONALE:
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent [Alabama] does not suggest that we lack jurisdiction to review the voluntary character of petitioner's guilty plea because he failed to raise that federal question below and the state court failed to pass upon it. But the question was raised on oral argument and we conclude that it is properly presented. The very Alabama statute (Ala.Code, Tit. 15, 382 (10) (1958)), that provides automatic appeal in capital cases also requires the reviewing court to comb the record for "any error prejudicial to the appellant, even though not called to our attention in brief of counsel." Lee v. State, 265 Ala. 623, 630, 93 So.2d 757, 763. The automatic appeal statute "is the only provision under the Plain Error doctrine of which we are aware in Alabama criminal appellate review." . . . It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary. That error, under Alabama procedure, was properly before the court below and considered explicitly by a majority of the justices and is properly before us on review.
A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment. (Citation omitted.) Admissibility of a confession must be based on a "reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1786, 12 L.Ed.2d 908. The requirement that the prosecution spread on the record the prerequisites of a valid waiver is no constitutional innovation. In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S., 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, we dealt with the problem of waiver of the right to counsel, a Sixth Amendment right. We held: "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."
We think that the same standard must be applied to determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made. For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, lack of comprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality. The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by federal standards. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422, 85 S.Ct. 1974, 1978, 13 L.Ed.2d 934.
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. Firs, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discards that function, he leaves a record inadequate for any review that may be later sought. [Citations omitted.]
The three dissenting justices in the Alabama Supreme Court stated the law accurately when they concluded that there was reversible error "because the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty." 281 Ala., at 663, 207 So.2d, at 415.
[The conviction was] Reversed.
Mr. Justice HARLAN, whom Mr. Justice BLACK, joins, dissenting.
The Court today holds that petitioner Boykin was denied due process of law, and that his robbery convictions must be reversed outright, solely because "the record [is] inadequate to show that petitioner . . . intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty." Ante, at 1711. The Court thus in effect fastens upon the States, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the rigid prophylactic requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. . . .
I* * *
Petitioner was not sentenced immediately after the acceptance of his plea. Instead, pursuant to an Alabama statute, the court ordered that "witnesses . . . be examined, to ascertain the character of the offense," in the presence of a jury which would then fix petitioner's sentence. See Ala.Code,Tit. 14, 415 (1958); Tit. 15, 277. That proceeding occurred some two months after petitioner pleaded guilty. During that period, petitioner made no attempt to withdraw his plea. Petitioner was present in court with his attorney when the witnesses were examined. Petitioner heard the judge state the elements of common-law robbery and heard him announce that petitioner had pleaded guilty to that offense and might be sentenced to death. Again, petitioner made no effort to withdraw his plea.
On his appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, petitioner did not claim that his guilty plea was made involuntarily or without full knowledge of the consequences. In fact, petitioner raised no questions at all concerning the plea. In his petition and brief in this Court, and in oral argument by counsel, petitioner has never asserted that the plea was coerced or made in ignorance of the consequences. . . .
III* * *
I would hold that petitioner Boykin is not entitled to outright reversal of his conviction simply because of the "inadequacy" of the record pertaining to his guilty plea. Further, I would not vacate the judgment below and remand for a state-court hearing on voluntariness. For even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that petitioner would be entitled to such a hearing if he had alleged that the plea was involuntary, a matter which I find it unnecessary to decide, the fact is that he has never made any such claim. Hence, I consider that petitioner's present arguments relating to his guilty plea entitle him to no federal relief.
Notes
1. Why did the Court believe that the defendant must understand a guilty plea and its legal effects? Could a less than worldly defendant be induced to plead guilty by an overworked defense counsel? The essence of a plea bargain requires that a defendant know what he or she has "purchased" with the decision to forego a formal trial. From your reading of Boykin, are you sure that he understood the legal effect of his guilty plea? From a practical perspective, what did the defendant in Boykin gain by pleading guilty to five capital offenses? Anything?
2. In order not to be misleading, the punishment of death for robbery is not permissible under current interpretations of the Eighth Amendment. At the time when Boykin was decided, the death penalty could be given for robbery. However, such a sentence would prove unconstitutional following the Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In Coker, the Court overturned a death sentence for rape where the penalty was deemed disproportionate to the actual crime. The Court held that, under the circumstances, "the death penalty, which is unique in its severity and irrevocability, is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."
3. In United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995), the defendant-respondent was convicted on federal drug charges. During his trial, after being cross-examined by the prosecutor, over his counsel's objection, he admitted to making inconsistent statements during earlier plea negotiation discussions. These statements contradicted his trial testimony. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that respondent's agreement that any statements he made in the plea discussion could be used at trial for impeachment purposes was unenforceable under Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) (Rules or plea statement Rules), which exclude from admission into evidence against a criminal defendant statements made during plea bargaining. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that an agreement to waive the usual rule that plea negotiation discussions cannot be used against the negotiator if the case goes to trial is valid and enforceable absent some affirmative indication that the defendant entered the agreement unknowingly or involuntarily. If the Supreme Court had not reversed this case, a defendant could tell one story at plea bargaining time in an attempt to get a "good deal" and if things did not work out and the case eventually went to trial, a defendant would have a "license to lie" because he could not be contradicted by his earlier inconsistent statements.
Guilty Plea Permitted Even While Professing Innocence
NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFORD, Supreme Court of the United States (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160
FACTS:
The state of North Carolina indicted Alford for the capital offense of first degree murder. The court assigned counsel to Alford for the purpose of preparing his defense. According to Mr. Alford, numerous witnesses existed who would substantiate his innocence. His attorney conducted an investigation into the testimony the witnesses were prepared to offer. Faced with the prospect that the testimony of these witnesses would have indicated guilt rather then innocence, Alford's counsel recommended that Alford accept a plea bargain and plead guilty to second-degree murder with the certainty that the death penalty could not be inflicted.
Alford accepted the prosecutor's offer and pled guilty to second-degree murder after three witnesses for the government presented damaging testimony strongly indicative of guilt. Alford took the witness stand and testified that he was innocent but was pleading guilty to eliminate the possibility of receiving the death penalty. Defense counsel elicited the facts that the plea was knowingly and intelligently made. He ultimately received the maximum penalty of thirty years imprisonment.
When appellee's post-conviction relief in the state court system failed, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. His efforts bore fruit when the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel prior to the entry of his guilty plea. According to the Court of Appeals, the lack of competent counsel to assist in his legal defense, rendered his guilty plea involuntary. North Carolina appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
When a defendant upon advice of counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case, pleads guilty to avoid the possibility of the death penalty, is such guilty plea coerced and therefore involuntarily made?
HELD: No.
RATIONALE:
Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We held in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), that a plea of guilty which would not have been entered except for the defendant's desire to avoid a possible death penalty and to limit the maximum penalty to life imprisonment or a term of years was not for that reason compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Jackson [v. United States, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)] established no new test for determining the validity of guilty pleas. The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). (Other citations omitted.) That he would not have pleaded except for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea would be to the defendant's advantage. . . .
* * *
Ordinarily, a judgment of conviction resting on a plea of guilty is justified by the defendant's admission that he committed the crime charged against him and his consent that judgment be entered without a trial of any kind. The plea usually subsumes both elements, and justifiably so, even though there is no separate, express admission by the defendant that he committed the particular acts claimed to constitute the crime charged in the indictment. (Citations omitted.) Here Alford entered his plea but accompanied it with the statement that he had not shot the victim.
If Alford's statements were to be credited as sincere assertions of his innocence, there obviously existed a factual and legal dispute between him and the State. Without more, it might be argued that the conviction entered on his guilty plea was invalid, since his assertion of innocence negatived any admission of guilt, which, as we observed last Term in Brady, is normally "[c]entral to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant . . . ." 397 U.S., at 748, 90 S.Ct., at 1468.
In addition to Alford's statement, however, the court had heard an account of the events on the night of the murder, including information from Alford's acquaintances that he had departed from his home with his gun stating his intention to kill and that he had later declared that he had carried out his intention.
* * *
State and lower federal courts are divided upon whether a guilty plea can be accepted when it is accompanied by protestations of innocence and hence contains only a waiver of trial but no admission of guilt. Some courts, giving expression to the principle that "our law only authorizes a conviction where guilt is shown." Harris v. State, 76 Tex.Cr.R. 126, 131, 172 S.W. 975, 977 (1915), require that trial judges reject such pleas. [Citations omitted.] But others have concluded that they should not "force any defense on a defendant in a criminal case," particularly when advancement of the defense of guilt, is at times uncertain and elusive," "[a]n accused, though believing in or entertaining doubts respecting his innocence, might reasonably conclude a jury would be convinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty. . . ." [Citation omitted.]
* * *
Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.
Nor can we perceive any material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence when, as in the instant case, a defendant intelligently concludes tat his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt. Here the State had a strong case of first-degree murder against Alford. Whether he realized or disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because in his view he had absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the overwhelming evidence against him, a trial was precisely what neither Alford nor his attorney desired. Confronted with the choice between a trial for first-degree murder, on the one hand, and a plea of guilty to second-degree murder, on the other, Alford quite reasonably chose the latter and thereby limited the maximum penalty to a 30-year term. When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered, . . . , its validity cannot be seriously questioned. In view of the strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State and Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence, we hold that the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting it.
* * *
Vacated and remanded.
Notes
1. Why would Alford continue to profess his innocence when he was still willing to plead guilty to murder? Do you believe that an innocent person would plead guilty to a murder not committed to avoid the possibility of receiving the death penalty? Was Alford's guilty plea really involuntary by "coercion" and fear of the death penalty? If you had been the judge, would you have felt comfortable in accepting Alford's plea?
2. Alford stands for the proposition that a defendant may have the luxury of denying that he or she committed the crime and, yet, enter a guilty plea which implicitly admits guilt of the crime. Generally, a judge would not be bound to accept such a plea since the admission of guilt proves somewhat ambiguous concerning guilt and there is no federal constitutional right to plead guilty to any particular crime. If the judge in Alford had refused to accept the guilty plea, what course of action would you have advised Mr. Alford to have pursued?