Administrative Searches to Determine Cause of Fire
MICHIGAN v. CLIFFORD, Supreme Court of the United States (1984), 464 U.S. 287, 104 S.Ct. 641
FACTS:
While Raymond and Emma Clifford were away from their home, a fire of suspicious origin caused extensive damage to their residence. The fire was reported to the Detroit Fire Department which dispatched crews to the scene at 5:42 a.m. All fire equipment, fire fighters, and police left the scent at 7:04 a.m. the same day.
Information of the fire reached the Cliffords who instructed their insurance company to hire a crew to secure the house and take other necessary preservative procedures. While the boarding crew was still at work, two arson investigators arrived on the scene and seized a Coleman fuel can [normally contains white gasoline] located in plain view from the driveway.
When sufficient water had been pumped from the basement, by the crew, the arson investigators, without consent, administrative warrant, or criminal search warrant, entered the basement. They discovered more fuel cans, a crock pot, and a timer with attached wires. The arson investigators seized this evidence and continued the investigation.
The search of the remainder of the Clifford home disclosed bare walls from which all pictures and decoration had been removed and the bedroom dressers were full of old clothes. They located cassettes and wiring for a video tape player, but no machine. The evidence clearly pointed toward arson.
The Cliffords were charged with arson and subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from the basement and the upstairs of the home, contending that the searches were for purposes of gathering criminal evidence. The trial court denied the motion, but the Cliffords took an interlocutory plea to the Michigan Court of Appeals. This Court reversed the trial court because it found no exigent circumstances to justify the search. The State of Michigan filed the petition for certiorari in which it argued that all administrative investigations should be exempt from the warrant requirement since such intrusions are reasonable.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where a search of fire-damaged premises is conducted by arson investigators several hours after the fire-related emergency has ceased, must the investigators obtain a criminal search warrant where they plan to search for evidence of criminal arson?
HELD: Yes.
RATIONALE:
Justice POWELL announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Justices BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL joined.
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III
In its petition for certiorari, the State does not challenge the state court's finding that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the search of the Clifford's home. Instead, it asks us to exempt from the warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire. We decline to do so.
In [Michigan v.]Tyler, we restated the Court's position that administrative searches generally require warrants. 436 U.S., at 504-508. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). We reaffirm that view again today. Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant requirement of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutionality of warrantless and nonconsensual entries onto fire-damaged premises, therefore, normally turns on several factors: whether there are legitimate privacy interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent circumstances justify the government intrusion regardless of any reasonable expectations of privacy; and, whether the object of the search is to determine the cause of the fire or top gather evidence of criminal activity.
A
We observed in Tyler that reasonable privacy expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises. "People may go on living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain on the fire-damaged premises." Tyler, 436 U.S., at 505. Privacy expectations will vary with the type of property, the amount of fire damage, the prior and continued use of the premises, and in some cases the owner's efforts to secure it against intruders. Some fires may be so devastating that no reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The test essentially is an objective one: whether "the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). (HARLAN, J., concurring). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739- 741 (1979). If reasonable privacy interests remain in the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.
B
A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials need no warrant to remain for "a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished." 36 U.S., at 510. Where, however, reasonable expectations of privacy remain in the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police officials have left the scene, generally must be made pursuant to a warrant or the identification of some new exigency.
The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not apply in such cases.
C
If a warrant is necessary, the object of the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. To obtain such a warrant, fire officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a reasonable and convenient time.
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized under the "plain view" doctrine. . . .
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The searches of the Clifford home, at least arguably, can be viewed as two separate ones: the delayed search of the basement area, followed by the extensive search of the residential portion of the house. We now apply the principles outlined above to each of these searches.
IV
The Clifford home was a two-and-one-half story brick and frame residence. . . . At the time Lieutenant eyer and his partner arrived, the home was uninhabitable. But personal belongings remained, and the Cliffords had arranged to have the house secured against intrusion in their absence. Under these circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations of privacy associated with a home, we hold that the Cliffords retained reasonable privacy interests in their fire-damaged residence and that the post-fire investigations were subject to the warrant requirement. . . .
A
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In Tyler we upheld a warrantless post-fire search of a furniture store, despite the absence of exigent circumstances, on the ground that it was a continuation of a valid search begun immediately after the fire. . . .
As the State conceded at oral argument, this case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the challenged search was not a continuation of an earlier search. Between the time the fire fighters had extinguished the blaze and left the scene and the arson investigators first arrived about 1:00 p.m. to begin their investigation, the Cliffords had taken steps to secure the privacy interests that remained in their residence against further intrusion. . . . Second, the privacy interests in the residence - particularly after the Cliffords had acted - were significantly greater than those in the fire-damaged furniture store, making the delay between the fire and the mid-day search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. . . . At least where a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police units have left the scene, we hold that a subsequent post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the identification of some new exigency. So long as the primary purpose is to ascertain the cause of the fire, an administrative warrant will suffice.
B
Because the cause of the fire was then known, the search of the upper portions of the house described above, could only have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson. Absent exigent circumstances, such a search requires a criminal warrant.
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As soon as the investigators determined that the fire had originated in the basement and had been caused by the crock pot and timer found beneath the basement stairs, the scope of their search was limited to the basement area. Although the investigators could have used whatever evidence they discovered in the basement to establish probable cause to search the remainder of the house, they could not lawfully undertake that search without a prior judicial determination that a successful showing of probable cause had been made. Because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the upstairs search, and it was undertaken without a prior showing of probable cause before an independent judicial officer, we hold that this search of a home was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, regardless of the validity of the basement search. * * *
It is so ordered.
Notes
1. The search of the Clifford became an administrative search at what point? When the fire investigators arrived to determine the origin of the fire or when the investigators entered the basement? Was an administrative warrant necessary? At what point did it enter a criminal search for evidence of arson? If the investigators validly entered the building immediately after the fire for an administrative determination of the cause of the fire and determined that criminal means caused the fire, the evidence disclosed would be covered by the "plain view doctrine." Consult the Gilbert supplement material on the Plain View Doctrine.
2. Did the Court seem to believe that the Cliffords' expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment had been enhanced by their efforts to have the property secured by the boarding crew? Should it make a difference?
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