THE CONCEPT OF ARREST AND PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST
The Concept of Probable Cause for Arrest
The Fourth Amendment requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause" which means that where a court is to issue an arrest warrant, it must make a finding that a strong fact pattern indicates good reason to think a person has committed a crime. Historically, arrests have been made since colonial times without the use of warrants and a warrant is not a necessity presently. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In cases where police determine probable cause, a judge or magistrate must reconsider whether probable cause exists within a reasonable time following the arrest. A reasonable time to be incarcerated on less than a judicial showing of probable cause is forty-eight hours. See Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. (1991).
Probable Cause Defined
Probable cause has been defined as where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a prudent person of reasonable caution in believing that a particular person is or has committed a particular offense. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), This Chapter. The level of belief is much more than a mere hunch and falls far below proof sufficient for guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The officer may have personally observed the facts giving rise to probable cause, have received information from a fellow officer, have received some or all information from an informant, or a combination of all of the above. If an informant offered the basis for probable cause, courts generally want to know what facts the informant observed and why the court should believe the particular informant. In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), This Chapter, an informant of known reliability gave excellent information concerning drug trafficking which was later corroborated by a law enforcement official. The information matured probable cause to arrest because of its detail and its reliable source.
Although the majority of arrests occur without the utilization of an arrest warrant, the existence of probable cause for an arrest remains an absolute prerequisite for a valid arrest. Where the arrest of an individual occurs without a judicial determination of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment protection of a judicial magistrate is not eliminated, but merely postponed until the initial appearance, arraignment, or preliminary hearing.
Requirements for Arrest within the Home
The Fourth Amendment has been judicially construed to prohibit a warrantless arrest within one's home unless exigent circumstances or hot pursuit apply. The and expectation of privacy in one's home is so strong that even police may not transgress the home boundaries without a warrant or some special circumstance. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), This Chapter. Possession of an arrest warrant indicates that a judicial official has determined that circumstances reasonably permit the seizing of the person wherever the individual may be located, including within the person's home.
The Legal Requirement of Probable Cause to Arrest
BECK v. OHIO, Supreme Court of the United States (1964)379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223
FACTS:
Defendant William Beck was ordered to pull over and park his automobile by police officers who suspected that he was involved in gambling. The officers immediately arrested Beck and conducted a search of his automobile which revealed nothing indicative of criminal activity. At a nearby police station, a search of his person revealed a quantity of clearing house slips in his sock.
The initial decision to stop Beck and arrest him was motivated by officers' knowledge that defendant had a prior record involving gambling convictions, that they knew his identity from a picture, and that they had "heard reports" that someone reliable had stated that Beck possessed clearing house slips. The officers conducted this individual stop, search, and arrest in the absence of any probable cause or warrant either for a search or an arrest.
The defendant was charged in a municipal court with possession of clearing house slips. He filed a timely motion to suppress the evidence seized from the search of his person subsequent to his arrest. The motion was overruled and the municipal court rendered a verdict of guilty. A state court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where a defendant possesses a prior criminal record, where police knew him by the use of a picture, and where police "heard" that he possessed illegal items, will such information constitute probable cause for an arrest?
HELD: No.
RATIONALE:
Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
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In turning to the question of whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest, it may be well to repeat what was said by Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for eight members of the Court, in Ker v. California:
"While this Court does not sit as in nisi prius to appraise contradictory factual questions, it will, where necessary to the determination of constitutional rights, make an independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record so that it can determine for itself whether in the decision as to reasonableness the fundamental - i.e., constitutional - criteria established by this Court have been respected. The States are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet `the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to complain. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). Such a standard implies no derogation of uniformity in applying federal constitutional guarantees but is only a recognition that conditions and circumstances vary just as do investigative and enforcement techniques." 374 U.S. 23, at 34, 83 S.Ct. 1623, at 1630.
The trial court made no findings of fact in this case. The trial judge simply made a conclusory statement: "A lawful arrest has been made, and this was a search incidental to that lawful arrest." The Court of Appeals merely found "no error prejudicial to the appellant." In the Supreme Court of Ohio, Judge Zimmerman's opinion contained a narrative recital which is accurately excerpted in the dissenting opinions filed today. But, putting aside the question of whether this opinion can fairly be called the opinion of the court, such a recital in an appellate opinion is hardly the equivalent of findings made by the trier of the facts. In any event, after giving full scope to the flexibility demanded by "a recognition that conditions and circumstances vary just as do investigative and enforcement techniques," we hold that the arrest of the petitioner cannot on the record before us be squared with the demands of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The record is meager, consisting only of the testimony of one of the arresting officers, given at the hearing on the motion to suppress. As to the officer's own knowledge of the petitioner before the arrest, the record shows no more than that the officer "had a police picture of him and knew what he looked like," and that the officer knew that the petitioner had "a record in connection with clearing house and scheme of chance." Beyond that, the officer testified only that he had "information" that he had "heard reports," that "someone specifically did relate that information," and that he "knew who that person was." There is nowhere in the record any indication of what "information" or "reports" the officer had received, or beyond what has been set out above, from what source the "information" and "reports" had come. The officer testified that when he left the station house, "I had in mind looking for [Defendant Beck] in the area of East 115th Street and Beulah, stopping him if I did see him make a stop in that area." But the officer testified to nothing that would indicate that any informer had said that the petitioner could be found at that time and place. Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327. And the record does not show that the officers saw the petitioner "stop" before they arrested him, or that they saw, heard, smelled, or otherwise perceived anything else to give them ground for belief that the petitioner had acted or was then acting unlawfully.
No decision of this Court has upheld the constitutional validity of a warrantless arrest with support so scant as this record presents. . . .
An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment. "Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which an officer may act are more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent than where an arrest warrant is obtained." [Citation omitted.]
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Where the constitutional validity of an arrest is challenged, it is the function of a court to determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the arrest would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that an offense has been committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280,288,69 L.Ed. 543. If the court is not informed of the facts upon which the arresting officers acted, it cannot properly discharge that function. All the trial court was told in this case was that the officers knew what the petitioner looked like and knew that he had a previous record of arrest or convictions for violations of the clearing house law.
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It is possible that an informer did in fact relate information to the police officer in this case which constituted probable cause for the petitioner's arrest. But when the constitutional validity of that arrest was challenged, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to show with considerably more specificity than was shown in this case what the informer actually said, and why the officer thought the information was credible. We may assume that the officers acted in good faith in arresting the petitioner.
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If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only in the discretion of the police.
Reversed.
Notes
1. The legal requirement of probable cause has been stated as `whether the facts available to an officer at the moment of the arrest would warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed.' Probable cause must be more than mere suspicion or a hunch but need not rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Would additional information have changed the Court's perception on the presence or absence of probable cause? What facts could you add to the case to produce cause which would pass scrutiny by the Court?
2. If the officers had presented their evidence to a judicial official, would a judge have issued a warrant for the arrest of defendant? Why or why not?
3. Probable cause may not be established by evidence discovered after arrest; the facts giving rise to probable cause must be apparent prior to the arrest. If someone is guilty of a crime, why not use the facts disclosed by the arrest to establish probable cause for the arrest?
4. Where police discover evidence during a search incident to an unlawful arrest, the evidence generally cannot be used at trial to prove guilt. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 523 (1961), Chapter Twelve.
Probable Cause and Informant Reliability
DRAPER v. UNITED STATES, Supreme Court of the United States (1959)358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329
FACTS:
A federal narcotics agent, Marsh, arrested Draper for possession of heroin as he alighted from a train. The warrantless arrest had been promoted by information given to the agent by a "special employee" of the Bureau of Narcotics. This "special employee" told agent Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago by train to obtain three ounces of heroin and that he would return on one of two different morning trains. Included with this information was a physical description of Draper complete with the minute details of clothing he would be wearing.
On the appointed morning, a person matching the description given by the "employee" disembarked from the Chicago train and walked briskly away from the train. Marsh arrested Draper based on the description given by the "special employee" and based on his personal validation of these significant details. A search incident to arrest uncovered two envelopes of heroin and a syringe.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of heroin based on the lack of probable cause for an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court held that probable cause for an arrest existed and that the heroin was properly admitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where an informant has given reliable information in the past and where the description of a suspected criminal and his activities is quite detailed and later validated by an agent personally present, does probable cause for an arrest exist?
HELD: Yes.
RATIONALE:
Mr. Justice WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Petitioner [among other things] contends (1) that the information given by Hereford to Marsh was "hearsay" and, because hearsay is not legally competent evidence in a criminal trial, could not legally have been considered, but should have been put out of mind, by Marsh in assessing whether he had "probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" to arrest petitioner without a warrant, and (2) that, even if hearsay could lawfully have been considered, Marsh's information should be held insufficient to show "probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" to believe that petitioner had violated or was violating the narcotic laws and to justify his arrest without a warrant.
[The Court held that hearsay evidence constituted acceptable proof for use in determining probable cause for arrest.]
Nor can we agree with petitioner's second contention that Marsh's information was insufficient to show probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had violated or was violating the narcotic laws and to justify his arrest without a warrant. The information given to narcotic agent Marsh without a warrant. The information given to narcotic agent Marsh by "special employee" Hereford may have been hearsay to Marsh, but coming from one employed for that purpose and whose information had always been found accurate and reliable, it is clear that Marsh would have been derelict in his duties had he not pursued it. And when, in pursuing that information, he saw a man, having the exact physical attributes and wearing the precise clothing and carrying the tan zipper bag that Hereford had described, alight from one of the very trains from the very place stated by Hereford and start to walk at a "fast" pace toward the station exit, Marsh had personally verified every facet of the information given him by Hereford except whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag. And surely, with every other bit of Hereford's information being thus personally verified, Mash had "reasonable grounds" to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's information - that Draper would have the heroin with him - was likewise true.
"In dealing with probable cause. . ., we deal with probabilities These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. at page 175, 69 S.Ct. at page 1310. Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of a reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288.
We believe that, under the facts and circumstances here, Marsh had probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was committing a violation of the laws of the United States relating to narcotic drugs at the time he arrested him. The arrest was therefore lawful, and the subsequent search and seizure, having been made incident to that lawful arrest, were likewise valid. It follows that petitioner's motion to suppress was properly denied and that the seized heroin was competent evidence lawfully received at the trial.
Affirmed.
Notes
1. The problems attendant to determining the existence of probable cause when based on an informant's information must be evaluated in light of Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983), infra, This Chapter. Gates lowered the level of reliability demanded of an informant, making the procurement of search warrants significantly easier.
2. Where probable cause to arrest is present, law enforcement officials may arrest with or without a warrant. The Court in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), upheld the arrest of a suspected post office thief. Postal inspectors had sufficient time to procure a warrant for arrest but failed to do so. Despite the plain language of the Fourth Amendment which seems to suggest the use of a warrant, the Court deferred to common law practice and history under which probable cause warrantless arrests have been used since the ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 1791.
3. When an officer believes probable cause to arrest exists or has an arrest warrant, the legal authority to make the arrest carries with it the power to make the arrest effective. In some situations, it may not be reasonable to initiate the use of deadly force. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court held that where a police officer, who had probable cause to arrest, observed an apparently unarmed suspected felon in the act of escaping and shot and mortally wounded the suspect used an unreasonable level of force. On the other hand, the Court would have sanctioned the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a suspected felon if the officer had good cause to believe that the felon would pose a serious threat of death or serious injury to police or other persons. Should a felon be allowed to run from police without fear of the use of deadly force? Why should it not be reasonable to use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felony suspect? Can you be sure that the fleeing felon would not kill or seriously injure another person if escape is successful?
4. May the officer enter a home to arrest if the office does not possess a warrant? Absent exigent circumstance or hot pursuit, the Court in Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573 (1980), answered in the negative. According to the Court, warrantless, nonconsensual arrests are prohibited even where the probable cause is for a felony. The Court reaffirmed the necessity of an arrest warrant in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), infra, Next Case, where the Court ruled as illegal the warrantless arrest inside the defendant's home for a nonjailable traffic offense. Significantly, Welsh did not involve hot pursuit or exigent circumstances.
A WARRANT GENERALLY REQUIRED FOR ARREST IN HOME
WELSH v. WISCONSIN, Supreme Court of the United States (1984)466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091
FACTS:
On a rainy night in April, 1978, petitioner Edward Welsh, in an inebriated state, drove his automobile into an open field. A single witness stopped to assist Welsh and suggest that they wait for the police. Petitioner requested that the witness drive him home. When petitioner did not receive his ride, he walked home from the scene.
The witness, Randy Jablonic, informed police of the condition of Welsh including details relative to his lack of sobriety. A license check of the abandoned vehicle led police to Welsh's home where his stepdaughter opened the door. Without a warrant, and apparently without valid consent, the police entered Welsh's home and made their way to the bed of Welsh. At this point the police placed him under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, a noncriminal violation for which the maximum penalty was a $200 fine.
After his removal to a police station and upon being warned of the consequences of a refusal to take a breath test for alcohol, defendant Welsh declined to furnish a sample of his breath. Wisconsin law allows a suspect to refuse a test for blood alcohol and where such underlying arrest was unlawful, no adverse consequences follow.
The legality of warrantless arrests in the home was discussed by the Supreme Court in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). There the Court held that in the absence of a warrant, or exigent circumstances, arrests inside the home are not allowed under the Fourth Amendment.
The Wisconsin trial court held that the arrest was valid and that his refusal to take the breath test was unreasonable. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the warrantless arrest of Welsh violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals held that although the state had demonstrated probable cause to arrest, it failed to prove that exigent circumstances existed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where governmental agents have probable cause to arrest, but lack a warrant and where exigent circumstances do not exist, may the agents enter the suspect's home to effectuate an arrest for a non-jailable traffic offense?
HELD: NO.
RATIONALE:
Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
* * *II
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has recognized, as "a `basic principle of the Fourth Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the presence of `exigent circumstances'"). (Other citations omitted.)
Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probably cause and exigent circumstances. Id., at 583-590. At the same time, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id., at 583, thereby leaving to the lower court the initial application of the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated," United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S., at 318, and that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, see, e.g. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 756, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the home, see Santana, supra.
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is especially appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden if on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.
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Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 320, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (1970). . . .
For example, court have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22 (CA2 1978) (allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for nonfelonious crimes. See, e.g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded.") (Other citations omitted.) The approach taken in these cases should not be surprising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these particular holdings or considering every possible factual situation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.
We therefore conclude that the common sense approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures," and hold that an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, see Payton, supra, application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely by sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed.
Application f this principle to the facts of the present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of the crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, and was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level.
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. 346.65(2) (1975); id., 345.65(2)(a) (1981-1982); supra, at 5. This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. Given this expression of the state's interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. To allow a warrantless home entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will not sanction.
III
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however, is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Justice REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.
At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976). But the requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment, [Citations omitted.], and we have never held that a warrant is constitutionally required to arrest for nonfelony offenses occurring out of the officer's presence.
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Notes
1. In Warden v. Hayden, 378 U.S. 294 (1967), pursuant to a radio tip, the police followed the defendant to a home which he entered. The enforcement officials entered the home without a warrant and arrested him in a bed. The crime for which the police arrested defendant was robbery. Hayden is an excellent example of the "hot pursuit" doctrine which allows police to follow a person subject to arrest wherever he or she may go so long as the pursuit is fairly close to the subject and it is a continuous pursuit. Having read the principal case, would Hayden be decided differently today? Why or why not? Can Hayden be distinguished from the principal case?
2. A person may be subject to a warrantless probable cause arrest inside her home if the arrest has been initiated outside the home and the subject of the arrest retreats within the home. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the Court held that because Santana was in a public place [on the threshold of her front door] for Fourth Amendment purposes, the entry into her home was much like the entry approved in Warden v. Hayden, above, and amounted to a hot pursuit.
3. Where police made an arrest which transgressed the rule of Payton, derivative evidence obtained outside of the home should be admissible. The defendant in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), was arrested within his own home without a warrant but with probable cause. The police offered Harris the traditional Miranda warnings prior to leaving his home, at the police station, and prior to speaking with a prosecutor. He made inculpatory statements on all three occasions. The Court held that the statements made at his home should be suppressed, but that the other statements should be admissible in court. The warrant requirement for in-home arrests was designed to protect the home and that purpose was fully served by suppression of statements made at the home. His statements made away from his home were not the fruit of being in unlawful custody. Therefore, Harris' second two statements should have been admitted against him at trial.
4. When police effect an arrest pursuant to a warrant, the judicial determination of probable cause has been made prior to the arrest and, generally, need not be done again as a matter of routine procedure. However, when an arrest has been made on the basis of a police officer's determination of probable cause, a judicial official must reconsider the officer's conclusions concerning probable cause. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. (1991), the Court held that a judicial probable cause hearing should be held within 48 hours following arrest. Where a longer period elapses between the arrest and the judicial probable cause determination, the burden rests with the government to show that such delay was reasonable under the circumstances. An illegal arrest does not affect the government's ability to prosecute the defendant for the crime or crimes.