CHAPTER THREE: MIRANDA WARNINGS AND PRACTICE
The Basis for the Warnings
The Supreme Court of the United States decided a series of cases prior to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel following an arrest emerged as a requirement for custodial interrogation. The most salient of these cases was Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), in which the Court ruled a confession inadmissible due to the manner in which it had been obtained. During interrogation the police denied Escobedo the assistance of counsel, despite his clear and unambiguous request, until he had given a confession. In addition, the police did not inform Mr. Escobedo that he had a right to remain silent. The Supreme Court held that the confession, although voluntarily given under traditional analysis, was nevertheless inadmissible due to the denial of the right to assistance of counsel.
Prerequisites for Miranda Warnings
Following the decision of Miranda v. Arizona, government law enforcement agencies in all jurisdictions were required to carefully advise a detainee of her constitutional rights if police questioning was contemplated. Initially, the Miranda warnings had to be given only in felony cases, but subsequent decisions extended the right to be apprised of constitutional rights to misdemeanant detainees who are questioned while in custody. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). In Miranda, the Court presumed that all questioning by law enforcement officials was coercive if a person had been placed in custody. In order to ensure that the detainee's rights under the Constitution of the United States would not be violated, government law enforcement officials were required to advise the detainee of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled testimonial self-incrimination and of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
Substance of Warnings
Under the requirements of Miranda, the police must advise the individual that the person has a complete right to silence and is under no duty to speak with an officer about anything. Police must clearly inform the suspect that he has the right to consult with an attorney and to have the lawyer present during consensual interrogation. The police have a further duty to inform the individual that if he/she chooses to speak or otherwise submit to interrogation, anything which is said may be used against the person in a court of law.
In order to enforce the Fifth Amendment right against compelled testimonial self-incrimination, the Miranda Court required that law enforcement officers explain to each detainee that the detainee has the right under the Sixth Amendment to consult with counsel prior to making any decision concerning whether to speak with police and may have counsel present during questioning. The police must make clear to the detainee that the right to consult counsel prior to and during questioning is available regardless of the individual's ability to pay for legal advice.
The circumstances under which the Miranda warnings are typically administered often prove to be less than ideal. In an effort to fully comply with the Miranda requirements, police officers often resort to a reading of the warnings from a printed form or card. Problems arise where police officers offer the warnings in less than perfect order or, in some cases, with less than textbook clarity. In Duckworth v. Eagan, infra, in a Later Lesson, the Supreme Court approved a warning given in a confusing manner provided ambiguities were clarified within the same warning.
The police are under no affirmative duty to warn detainee of the above constitutional rights until the law enforcement officer places the individual in custody and desires to initiate questioning. Thus, the "triggering" factors giving rise to the necessity of offering the Miranda warnings are governmental custody and interrogation. If custody exists and interrogation occurs, any statements made by the subject prior to the administration of proper warnings cannot be admitted in evidence against defendant for proof of guilt. See, infra, in a Later Lesson, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). However, evidence taken in violation of Miranda may have utility for impeachment purposes where the defendant takes the witness stand and directly contradicts earlier, non-Mirandized statements. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
Once the warnings have been properly administered, the subject may choose to assert rights under Miranda or may decide to waive the rights to silence and/or counsel. If the arrestee indicates in any manner and at any time that he does not desire to be interrogated or questioned further, police inquiry must stop, according to the Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Even where police attempt to question an arrestee about additional crimes unrelated to the reason for custody and the arrestee has previously invoked Miranda, such questioning runs afoul of Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). However, when the arrestee has not refused to speak with police, but has been to court on different charges, police may ask if the arrestee is willing to waive Miranda rights and speak with police concerning criminal matters unrelated to the reason the defendant was in court. See, McNeil v. Wisconsin, 498 U.S. (1991).
Waiver of Miranda
In order to relinquish the protections offered by Miranda, an individual may indicate the decision to waive Miranda rights by an oral statement, a written statement, both, or by other conduct indicating waiver. Typically, investigators prefer to obtain a written statement of waiver, but during the initial phases of an investigation such practice may prove difficult. For example, if an arrestee purportedly makes a valid waiver and subsequently denies so doing, the burden of proof rests with the government to demonstrate that the decision to waive constitutional rights was a knowing and intelligent decision. The prosecution has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
What Constitutes Custody?
In order to determine when the offering of the Miranda warnings are dictated, an understanding of the legal definitions of custody and interrogation prove essential. While the meaning of the term, "in custody," would appear to be quite clear, the Court in Miranda considered custody to exist when the individual had been restrained of his freedom of movement in any significant manner. However, an individual may believe that the police have taken custody when, in fact, the police have made no such decision. Alternatively, the detainee may feel free to leave when, in reality, police would restrain the person if he initiated an attempt to depart. Another view of when custody exists focuses on the point in time when a reasonable officer would believe that custody has been taken of the individual. The Court in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), noted that the police officer's unarticulated decision has no bearing on whether the subject was in custody, but that the test for custody is "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood" the situation.
What Constitutes Interrogation?
The second factor to be considered in determining whether Miranda warnings need to be administered concerns the question of interrogation. In most situations, the act of interrogation of a detainee can be discerned by the manner and the phraseology of the communication itself. In other situations, subtlety of communication may disguise a question and have it appear as a declarative sentence. In Rhode Island v. Innis, infra, in a Later Lesson, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that the term, "interrogation," for Miranda purposes includes not only express questions, but interrogation also refers to "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." The Innis Court clearly indicated that the definition of interrogation focuses on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than on the designs of the police. If two police officers were to speak with each other in front of an arrestee and comment that if one of them had been arrested, he would certainly have denied guilt or have explained his innocence, courts would hold that the arrestee had been interrogated. Such conduct practically begs an arrestee to initiate conversation which the police desire to hear. Consistent with a warning of the right to remain silent is the requirement that a prosecutor may not benefit from an individual's post-arrest silence as a tacit admission of guilt or later impeach a defendant-witness who has exercised the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
Under Miranda both custody and interrogation must be present prior to "triggering" the administration of the constitutional warnings. If police merely make an arrest with no immediate design of interrogation, there is no absolute need to offer Miranda warnings. Similarly, where a question, directed to a person clearly not in custody, might elicit an incriminating response, no Miranda warning is absolutely essential. Where the police question an arrestee within a jail cell and the arrestee is unaware that the person with whom he is speaking is a police officer, no Miranda warnings are necessary provided the plain clothed officer does not question the arrestee about the crime for which he is in custody. See Illinois v. Perkins, 494 U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2394 (1990).
Although the Court initially required Miranda warnings in every situation in which law enforcement officials desired to conduct custodial interrogation, the Court recognized an exception in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Where an immediate danger to the safety of the public or of a police officer appears to exist, police may question the suspect in an effort to alleviate the danger, prior to offering warnings. In Quarles, the officer had reason to believe that the detainee had hidden a loaded gun near the officer which could have been used to harm the officer or the public. Under the circumstances, the officer was free to inquire about the weapon and the prosecution was permitted to introduce both the weapon and the oral answers against the defendant, despite the absence of Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation. The exact limits of the emergency or public safety exception to Miranda are not yet known, but presumably extend to cases of kidnapping involving imminent harm, live bombs or other explosives, and poisons posing an immediate danger to public safety.
Requirements and Rationale for Miranda Warnings
MIRANDA v. Arizona Supreme Court of the United States (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602
FACTS:
Ernesto Miranda was arrested by law enforcement officers on March 13, 1963 and was subsequently taken to the police station in Phoenix. After being identified by the complaining witness, the police removed Miranda to an interrogation room where he was questioned for two hours. He had not been advised of his right to have counsel. At the end of the period, Miranda and the police emerged from the room with a signed confession in which Miranda acknowledged that he had voluntarily confessed with complete knowledge that his statement could be used against him in court.
Over counsel's objection that the confession was obtained in violation of Miranda's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the confession was admitted in evidence. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and sentenced to 20 to 30 years on each count with the sentences to be served concurrently.
The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the conviction on its holding that none of Miranda's rights had been violated. The court relied heavily on the admitted fact that Miranda had not specifically requested the assistance of counsel.
[The Supreme Court of the United States consolidated several other cases with Miranda for purposes of judicial economy.]
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
In order to produce admissible evidence, must law enforcement officials warn a person in custody of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel prior to initiating custodial interrogation?
HELD: Yes.
RATIONALE:
Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admission, and in three of them, signed statements as well which were admitted at their trials. They all thus share salient features - incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.
An understanding of the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today. The difficulty in depicting what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they have largely taken place incommunicado.
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[The Court detailed various techniques described in law enforcement training manuals and utilized by enforcement officials designed to elicit information from a suspect during custodial interrogation. It noted that modern interrogation practices are psychologically oriented, rather than physically oriented.]
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From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times, relentless questioning, are employed. ... It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then often persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
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In the cases before us today ... we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring. In No. 759, Miranda v. Arizona, the police arrested the defendant and took him to a special interrogation room where they secured a confession.
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In [this case], we might not find the [defendant's] statement to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, or course, not lessened in the slightest.
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The question in these cases is whether the [Fifth Amendment] privilege is applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.
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This question, in fact, could have been taken as settled in federal courts almost 70 years ago, when, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), this Court held:
"In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment * * * commanding that no person `shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'"
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Because of the adoption by Congress of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Court's effectuation of that Rule in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), we have had little occasion in the past quarter century to reach the constitutional issues in dealing with federal interrogations. These supervisory rules, requiring production of an arrested person before a commissioner "without unnecessary delay" and excluding evidence obtained in default of that statutory obligation, were nonetheless responsive to the same considerations of Fifth Amendment policy that unavoidably face us now as to the States.
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III
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contained inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
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At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it - the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogatory's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the fact of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury. Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.
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The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system - that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.
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Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney.
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In order to fully apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system, then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent - the person most often subjected to interrogation - the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it.
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
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An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. A statement we made in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), is applicable here:
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."
Moreover, where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated.
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The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement. In Escobedo itself, the defendant fully intended his accusation of another as the slayer to be exculpatory as to himself.
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries. Under the system of warnings we delineate today or under any other system which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to be erected about the privileges must come into play at this point.
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. See Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765. When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.
In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
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Notes
1. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court noted that interrogation did not include volunteered statements which had not been prompted by police actions by holding that the admissibility in court of such statements was not affected by the Miranda decision.
2. The question of precisely when a person enters into police custody proves clear in some situations, but somewhat ambiguous in contexts. For example, in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 2000 (1979), the police, without probable cause and without consent, took the individual to the police station for interrogation. Dunaway would have been forcibly restrained if he had attempted to leave the police station and, during the interrogation, he was never told that he was free to leave. Under such circumstances, the Court considered that Dunaway was in custody for Miranda purposes.
3. Assume that an individual arrived at a police station and immediately began confessing his involvement in a bank robbery. Under Miranda, would the police officer on duty be required to stop the confession and warn the individual about his constitutional rights as per Miranda? Why or why not?
4. The right to remain silent under Miranda and the right to counsel are personal to the accused and do not belong to a family member or the arrestee's attorney. In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), the Supreme Court held that police deception of the defendant's attorney by not telling the attorney that her client was a homicide suspect and by actively misinforming the attorney that her client would not be interrogated until the next day, while not the best practice, did not violate the protections of Miranda. Similarly, when the police did not inform the suspect that his attorney wished to speak with him, such procedure did not affect the voluntariness of his statements to police. Clearly, the constitutional rights enforced by Miranda are personal to the accused and accrue to no other individual.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, police questions directed to bystanders at a crime scene do not necessarily indicate that the police have focused on a particular person. Police questioning of a person which does not result in an arrest may be indicative that the person was never in custody. In situations where the police tell the person that he is not in custody or that she is free to leave, courts generally do not find the presence of custody. See Archer v. United States, 393 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1968).
5. Concerning what conduct by police could be construed as either questioning or its functional equivalent, the Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), infra, in a Later Lesson, seemed to focus on the intent of the police officer while also looking at the conduct of the officer. The Innis court stressed that the test of whether police officers intended speech to constitute interrogation turned on whether a reasonable person would realize that his/her speech would be likely to produce an incriminating response from the person in custody.
6. Do police violate Miranda when they ask general questions of a person suspected of driving while under the influence of alcohol? In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), the Court held that the slurred answers given by an arrestee to standard questions relative to height, weight, address, date of birth, current age, and name and the fact that the arrestee failed agility tests which sober persons could accomplish were not violative of Miranda since they were not testimonial responses to custodial interrogation. The evidence offered by the standard tests merely reflected the arrestee's physical condition and were not testimony in the sense in which testimony is usually understood. Muniz stands for the proposition that a suspect in custody need not be advised of his/her Miranda rights where the questions asked are routine inquiries concerning physical facts which are not testimonial in nature.
7. Miranda warnings may be administered orally, presented to the detainee as a written form, or in both forms. An oral warning must be given in a manner in which the individual both understands the substance of the warning and its significance. A hurried oral Miranda warning which the subject does not understand will be considered insufficient. A written warning without more may cast doubt concerning whether the individual understood the warning adequately. The administration of the Miranda warning must be communicated in a language which the detainee clearly understands.
Supreme Court decisions such as Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 S.Ct. 2875 (1989), infra, in a Later Lesson, and California v. Prysock, 451 U.S. 130 (1981), indicate that precise warnings as dictated in Miranda may not be absolutely required. In Prysock the warnings offered did not clearly indicate that a lawyer would be available prior to any questioning. So long as the subject has a reasonably clear impression that a lawyer is or will be available and that the individual may remain silent, Miranda requirements have been sufficiently met.