Manner of Administering the Warning of Rights
DUCKWORTH v. EAGAN, Supreme Court of the United States, (1989), 492 U.S. 195, 109 S.Ct. 2875
FACTS:
While in custody, respondent admitted to stabbing a woman nine times following her refusal to engage in an act of sex. Subsequent to his arrest for attempted murder, police advised respondent of his rights as required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Respondent signed a written warning form subsequent to his denial of any criminal involvement.
The following day, while in custody, police officers sought to speak with respondent concerning his alleged crime. Immediately prior to questioning, one of the officers read to respondent the following waiver form:
"Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer."
The respondent signed the form while maintaining his innocence of the accusations.
[Police transferred respondent to Indiana when they discovered that the stabbings occurred in Indiana and not in Illinois.]
After spending over a day in the Hammond, Indiana jail, the police again interviewed the respondent and read the following warning to the respondent:
"1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the right to remain silent and that anything I might say may or will be used against me in a court of law.
"2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own choice before saying anything, and that an attorney may be present while I am making any statement or throughout the course of any conversation with any police officer if I so choose.
"3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the course of the taking of any statement or during the course of any such conversation.
"4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to answer any further questions and remain silent, thereby terminating the conversation.
"5. That if I do not hire an attorney, one will be provided for me." Id., at 1556.
Respondent orally read the form back to the officers, signed it, and confessed to stabbing the lady. Later, he assisted police in recovering the knife which had been used in the attack on the lady.
At his trial, he unsuccessfully attempted to have his confession and the knife suppressed from use as evidence. The trial court refused to suppress the evidence with a ruling that the police had sufficiently complied with the requirements of the Miranda warnings. Following a jury trial, the jury found him guilty of attempted murder. State courts upheld the original judgment.
As a result of his collateral attack, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals held that the writ should be granted since the words "if and when you go to court," which had been included in the original warning, proved to be defective since it could have confused respondent concerning his absolute right to counsel prior to questioning and linked the right to counsel prior to questioning with an event to occur in the future.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where a portion of a Miranda warning, taken alone, could be interpreted as somewhat confusing, but is clarified within the same warning, does such practice meet the demands of Miranda v. Arizona?
HELD: Yes.
RATIONALE:
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
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In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court established certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation. In now-familiar words, the Court said that the suspect must be told that "he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id., at 479. The Court in Miranda "presumed that interrogation in certain custodial circumstances is inherently coercive and ... that statements made under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically warned of his Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo those rights." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (footnote omitted).
We have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given that exact form described in that decision.
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We think the initial warnings given to respondent touched all of the bases required by Miranda. The police told respondent that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had the right to speak to an attorney before and during questioning, that he had "this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if [he could] not afford to hire one," and that he had the "right to stop answering at any time until [he] talked to a lawyer." 843 F. 2d, at 1555-1556. As noted, the police also added that they could not provide respondent with a lawyer, but that one would be appointed "if and when you go to court." The Court of Appeals thought this "if and when you go to court" language suggested that "only those accused who can afford an attorney have the right to have one present before answering any questions," and "implie[d] that if the accused does not 'go to court,' i.e.[,] the government does not file charges, the accused is not entitled to [counsel] at all." Id., at 1557.
In our view, the Court of Appeals misapprehended the effect of the inclusion of "if and when you go to court" language in Miranda warnings. First, this instruction accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana. Under Indiana law, counsel is appointed at the defendant's initial appearance in court, Ind. Code 35-33-7-6 (1988), and formal charges must be filed at or before that hearing.
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We hold that the initial warnings given to respondent, in their totality, satisfied Miranda, and therefore that the [use of] his first statement denying his involvement in the crime, as well as the knife and the clothing were all properly admitted into evidence. The Court of Appeals thought it necessary to remand this case for consideration of whether respondent's second statement was tainted by the first warnings. Id., at 1557-1558. In view of our disposition of this case, we need not reach that question. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with our decision.
It is so ordered.
Notes
1. The arrestee need not be informed of any or all the reasons why law enforcement officials wish to interrogate. In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 107 S.Ct. 851 (1987), Spring had been originally arrested for firearms violations, given Miranda warnings, and later was questioned by state officials concerning a homicide unrelated to the weapons charges. The Court felt that law enforcement officers had provided Spring with a warning which should be considered adequate to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his legal rights. The fact that state officials did not inform him precisely of their intent to interrogate concerning the homicide could only have affected the wisdom of his decision to speak and not the voluntariness of the decision.
The Meaning of Interrogation
RHODE ISLAND v. INNIS, Supreme Court of the United States, (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682
FACTS:
A Providence, Rhode Island taxicab driver disappeared following a dispatch to pick up a customer. Several days later, his body was discovered with a shotgun blast to the head. One day later, another taxicab driver reported that he had just been robbed by a man in possession of a sawed-off shotgun. While waiting to give an official statement, the driver noticed a photograph of Mr. Innis on the station house bulletin board. The driver also picked a photograph of Mr. Innis from a photographic array. The police began a search of the area in which the taxicab driver had been robbed.
On the same day, police found Mr. Innis, placed him under arrest, read him the standard Miranda warnings. Subsequently, a police captain read the rights to Mr. Innis a second time. Innis indicated that he wished to speak with an attorney, so the police began to transport the arrestee to the station house.
En route to the jail with Innis in the cruiser, two officers conversed about what a tragedy it would be if one of the children from the handicapped children's school happened to find a loaded shotgun.
Patrolman Gleckman later testified at Innis' trial:
"A. At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman McKenna stating that I frequent this area while on patrol [that because a school for handicapped children is located nearby,] there's a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves." App. 43-44
Officer Gleckman also indicated that it would be a tragedy if some little girl would find the gun and accidentally kill herself.
A third officer did not join the conversation, but Mr. Innis interrupted the two officers and told them to turn the cruiser around, that he would show them the location of the missing gun. The officers returned to the setting of the original arrest. The police captain, still on the arrest scene, again read the Miranda rights to Mr. Innis who indicated that he still understood them, but wanted to show the police the gun because of the danger to the local children.
At Mr. Innis' trial, over defense objections, the prosecutor introduced the shotgun as evidence. Following the return of a guilty verdict, Innis pursued his appellate remedies and succeeded in having the Rhode Island Supreme Court reverse his conviction. The Court concluded that since Innis had invoked his right to counsel, all questioning between the officers in the police cruiser constituted "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. In essence, Innis had been subjected to "subtle coercion" that was the equivalent of interrogation.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where police officers merely speak between themselves within hearing of an arrestee who has properly received Miranda warnings and do not attempt to get the arrestee to feel compelled to speak, does such conduct by police officers constitute interrogation under Miranda?
HELD: No.
RATIONALE:
Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, the court held that, once a defendant in custody asks to speak with a lawyer, all interrogation must cease until a lawyer is present. The issue in this case is whether the respondent was "interrogated" in violation of the standards promulgated in the Miranda opinion.
I* * *
We granted certiorari to address for the first time the meaning of "interrogation" under Miranda v. Arizona. 440 U.S. 934.
II
In its Miranda opinion, the court concluded that in the context of "custodial interrogation" certain procedural safeguards are necessary to protect a defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
The court in the Miranda opinion ... outlined in some detail the consequences that would result if a defendant sought to invoke those procedural safeguards. With regard to the right to the presence of counsel, the Court noted:
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.
* * *
The issue, therefore, is whether the respondent was "interrogated" by the police officers in violation of the respondent's undisputed right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer. In resolving this issue, we first define the term "interrogation" under Miranda before turning to a consideration of the facts of this case.
A
The starting point for defining "interrogation" in this context is, of course, the Court's Miranda opinion. There the Court observed that "[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id., at 444 (emphasis added). This passage and other references throughout the opinion to "questioning" might suggest that the Miranda rules were to apply only to those police interrogation practices that involve express questioning of a defendant while in custody.
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The Court in Miranda also included in its survey of interrogation practices the use of psychological ploys, such as to "postulate" "the guilt of the subject," to "minimize the moral seriousness of the offense," and "to cast blame on the victim or on society." Id., at 450. It is clear that these techniques of persuasion, no less than express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to amount to interrogation.
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It is clear therefore that the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. "Interrogation," as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Turning to the facts of the present case, we conclude that the respondent was not "interrogated" within the meaning of Miranda. It is undisputed that the first prong of the definition of "interrogation" was not satisfied, for the conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included no express questioning of the respondent. Rather, that conversation was, at least in form, nothing more than a dialogue between the two officers to which no response from the respondent was invited.
Moreover, it cannot be fairly concluded that the respondent was subjeted to the "functional equivalent" of questioning. It cannot be said, in short, that Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the respondent. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were aware that the respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that the police knew that the respondent was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest.
The case thus boils down to whether, in the context of a brief conversation, the officers should have known that the respondent would suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating response.
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It is our view, therefore, that the respondent was not subjected by the police to words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from him.
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For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
1. The Court in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987), 1075 S.Ct. 1931 (1987) approved police conduct which, though likely to produce incriminating evidence, was not considered the functional equivalent of Miranda prohibited interrogation. In Mauro, the police permitted the wife of defendant to converse with the jailed defendant while a police officer and an operating tape recorder were visible. Under such circumstances, the defendant's statements proved not to be the product of an improper interrogation since the police were not conducting the questioning and the situation could not be considered coercive because it did not involve any psychological ploys to get an arrestee to speak.
2. See New York v. Quarles, infra, for an example of a situation where Miranda warnings may not be absolutely required in cases of an emergency or where the safety of the public or police officers could be endangered if Miranda were administered prior to initial questioning.
When Interrogation Must Cease
EDWARDS v. ARIZONA, Supreme Court of the United States, (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880
FACTS:
The defendant, Edwards, was arrested following a sworn robbery complaint having been filed in an Arizona State Court. At the police station he was informed of his required Miranda rights, and initially agreed to talk with police.
Shortly after receiving information that another suspect in the same robbery had implicated defendant, Edwards gave a statement denying participation and presented an alibi defense. At this point, defendant desired to negotiate with the investigators. Told that only the prosecution could make deals, Edwards decided that he needed counsel and stated that, "I want an attorney before making a deal." Questioning by police ceased for the day.
The next morning, two different detectives wished to speak with the defendant. He responded that he did not desire to speak with anyone. His jailer informed Edwards that "he had" to speak with the detectives. The detectives, after identifying themselves and reading the Miranda rights again, indicated their desire to speak with Edwards.
After hearing the tape recording of the alleged accomplice who had implicated him, Edwards agreed to talk so long as his statements were not recorded. The officers told Edwards that whatever he might say could be used against him. Nevertheless, he proceeded to implicate himself in the robbery.
Ultimately, the trial court refused to suppress his statements to the detectives on the ground that the statements were voluntarily made. Subsequently, he was convicted of robbery. The Arizona Supreme court upheld the conviction on the grounds that Edwards had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and made a free and voluntary confession.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where police return to question a suspect who has requested counsel and who has been advised of his Miranda rights, for a second time, may the statement given be used against that defendant?
HELD: No.
RATIONALE:
Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
* * *
Because the use of Edward's confession against him at his trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, we reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court.
II
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against compelled self-incrimination required that custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of an attorney. 348 U.S., at 479. The Court also indicated the procedures to be followed subsequent to the warnings. If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent, "the interrogation must cease." If he requests counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id., at 474.
Miranda thus declared that an accused has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Here, the critical facts as found by the Arizona Supreme Court are that Edwards asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent..., but that the police, without furnishing his counsel, returned the next morning to confront him and as a result of the meeting secured incriminating oral admissions. Contrary to the holdings of the state courts, Edwards insists that having exercised his right ... to have counsel present during interrogation, he did not validly waive that right ... [W]e agree.
First, the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver where the accused has specifically invoked his right to counsel. It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case "upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
* * *
In referring to the necessity to find Edwards' confession knowing and intelligent, the State Supreme Court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). Yet, it is clear that Schneckloth does not control the issue presented in this case. The issue in Schneckloth was under what conditions an individual could be found to have consented to a search and thereby waived his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court declined to impose the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" standard and required only that the consent be voluntary... Schneckloth itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries. Here, however sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the voluntariness of Edwards' admission may be, neither the trial court nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus on whether Edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished (his Sixth Amendment right).
Second, although we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights ... [not to talk with police and] respond to interrogation, ... the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Miranda itself indicated that the assertion of the right to counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by the accused, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S., at 474. . . . [L]ast Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, the Court again referred to the "undisputed right" under Miranda to remain silent and to be free of interrogation "until he had consulted with a lawyer." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980). We reconfirm these views and, to lend them substance, emphasize that it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.
In concluding that the fruits of the interrogation initiated by the police... could not be used against Edwards, we do not hold or imply that Edwards was powerless to countermand his election or that the authorities could in no event use any incriminating statements made by Edwards prior to his having access to counsel. Had Edwards initiated the meeting ..., nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would prohibit the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against him at the trial. The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.
We think it is clear that Edwards was subjected to custodial interrogation ... within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, and that this occurred at the instance of the authorities. His statement, made without having had access to counsel, did not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible.
Accordingly, the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court that Edwards had waived his right to counsel was infirm, and the judgment of that court is reversed.
Chief Justice BURGER concurring in the judgment.
I concur only in the judgment because I do not agree that either any constitutional standard or the holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) - as distinguished from its dicta - calls for a special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to be free from interrogation.
* * *
Notes
1. Consistent with the principal case is the doctrine that once the suspect invokes Miranda rights and refuses to talk or to be interrogated, police may not initiate questioning about crimes unrelated to the original reason for custody. In Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093 (1988), the defendant was in custody for burglary and had requested a lawyer before answering any questions. Several days later, an officer investigating a separate burglary asked Roberson questions following new Miranda warnings. In the resulting voluntary conversation, Roberson admitted to the burglary which had been the focus of the second interrogation. The Supreme Court agreed with state court decisions which suppressed Roberson's confession on the basis that the police conduct violated both the spirit of Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Once a suspect decides not to talk without first speaking with counsel, such desire must be scrupulously honored unless and until the arrestee initiates further discussion by some affirmative act or otherwise demonstrates a waiver of rights under Miranda.
2. Compare Arizona v. Roberson, above, to the limitation of Miranda announced in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 498 U.S. (1991). In McNeil, the defendant was in custody and had appeared in court with an attorney. He remained in custody when an officer approached him concerning a homicide unrelated to the reason for which he was in custody. After the officer properly offered Miranda warnings, McNeil waived the right to counsel and implicated himself in the homicide by giving evidence which was used to convict him. On appeal, McNeil unsuccessfully contended that by appearing with counsel in court, such activity indicated that he only desired to speak when an attorney was present to assist him in properly invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court noted that although the appearance with counsel could have been an invocation of the right to counsel, merely appearing with counsel does not serve as an invocation of the right to have counsel during custodial interrogation. Here, McNeil was properly warned, had not earlier refused to speak with police concerning his crimes, and had intelligently waive his Miranda rights.
3. The rule of Edwards which contemplated no further custodial interrogation once the accused has asserted the right to counsel was not violated by further discussion initiated by the suspect and not prompted by the police. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); 103 S.Ct. 2830 (1983). In Bradshaw, after requesting counsel, the accused later asked, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" According to the Court, such a statement indicated a general desire to converse about the case, and, in light of the totality of the circumstances, it demonstrated a waiver of his right to have counsel present.
4. Under Miranda interpretations, investigators generally must cease questioning a suspect the moment he first indicates that he desires to speak with a lawyer. In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), the Court, in a per curiam opnion released in the absence of oral argument, held that questioning must cease instead of continuing a dialogue designed to get the defendant to change his mind on his decision to remain silent. The Court noted that a bright-line prohibition was required to prevent a subtle or intentional wearing down of the accused.