Scope of Search of Container within a Motor Vehicle
CALIFORNIA v. ACEVEDO, Supreme Court of the United States (1991), U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1982
FACTS:
Santa Ana, California police received a call from a federal drug enforcement agent in Hawaii that the government had seized drugs from the Federal Express system which were scheduled for local California delivery. Federal agents sent the package to the Santa Ana police department which, with the cooperation of the local Federal Express office, delivered the drugs to one J.R. Daza. The recipient drove to his apartment and carried the package inside.
A couple of hours later, respondent, Charles Acevedo arrived at the apartment, entered and left after a ten minute visit. As he headed for his automobile, police observed that he carried a brown paper bag of the same size as the marijuana shipped from Hawaii. Acevedo placed the package in the trunk of his Honda and attempted to drive away. Officers stopped his car and conducted a warrantless search for what they believed was marijuana. A search of the brown bag disclosed a quantity of marijuana.
In state court Acevedo failed to have the evidence suppressed and pled guilty reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court with the conclusion that although the police had probable cause to believe that the bag contained drugs, the bag should not have been opened without a warrant. In addition, the Court held that police lacked probable cause to believe that Acevedo's car itself otherwise contained contraband.
The Court reasoned that the case was controlled by United States v. Chadwick (1977), where officers would have been permitted to seize a container for which probable cause existed, but failed to obtain a needed warrant to open the container. The Supreme Court of California rejected the government's petition for review.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari for the purpose of clarifying search and seizure law applicable to a closed container in an automobile.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where police have probable cause to search a container within an automobile but lack probable cause to search the entire vehicle, may police stop the car, seize, and search the container without a warrant?
HELD: Yes.
RATIONALE:
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us once again to consider the so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and its application to the search of a closed container in the trunk of a car.
I* * *
In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, decided in 1982, we held that a warrantless search of an automobile under the Carroll doctrine could include a search of a container or package found inside the car when such a search was supported by probable cause.
In Ross, therefore, we clarified the scope of the Carroll doctrine as properly including a "probing search" of compartments and containers within the automobile so long as the search is supported by probable cause. Id., at 800.
In addition to this clarification, Ross distinguished the Carroll doctrine from the separate rule that governed the search of closed containers. See 456 U.S., at 817. The Court had announced this separate rule, unique to luggage and other closed packages, bags, and containers, in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had probable cause to believe that a 200-pound double-locked footlocker contained marijuana. The agents tracked the locker as the defendants removed it from a train and carried it through the station to a waiting car. As soon as the defendants lifted the locker into the trunk of the car, the agents arrested them, seized the locker, and searched it. In this Court, the United States did not contend that the locker's brief contact with the automobile's trunk sufficed to make the Carroll doctrine applicable. Rather, the United States urged that the search of movable luggage could be considered analogous to the search of an automobile. 433 U.S., at 11-12. The Court rejected this argument because, it reasoned, a person expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects than he does in his automobile.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Court extended Chadwick's rule to apply to a suitcase actually being transported in the trunk of a car. In Sanders, the police had probable cause to believe a suitcase contained marijuana. They watched as the defendant placed the suitcase in the taxi for several blocked, stopped, fond the suitcase in the trunk, and searched it. Although the Court had applied the Carroll doctrine to searches of integral parts of the automobile itself, (indeed, in Carroll, contraband whiskey was in the upholstery of the seats, see 267 U.S., at 136), it did not extend the doctrine to the warrantless search of personal luggage "merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police." 442 U.S., at 765. Again, the Sanders majority stressed the heightened privacy expectation in personal luggage and concluded that the presence of luggage in an automobile did not diminish the owner's expectation of privacy in his personal items.
In Ross, the Court endeavored to distinguish between Carroll, which governed the Ross automobile search, and Chadwick, which governed the Sanders automobile search. It held that the Carroll doctrine covered searches of automobiles when the police had probable cause to search an entire vehicle but that the Chadwick doctrine governed searches of luggage when the officers had probable cause to search only a container within the vehicle. Thus, in a Ross situation, the police could conduct a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment without obtaining a warrant, whereas in a Sanders situation, the police had to obtain a warrant before they searched.
The Court in Ross rejected Chadwick's distinction between containers and cars. . . . It also recognized that it was arguable that the same exigent circumstances that permit a warrantless search of an automobile would justify the warrantless search of a movable container. Id., at 809. In deference to the rule of Chadwick and Sanders, however, the Court put that question to one side. Id., at 809-810. . . . We now must decide the question deferred in Ross: whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car. We conclude that it does not.
IV
* * *
The line between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to search a package in that vehicle is not always clear, and separate rules that govern the two objects to be searched may enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless searches and diserve privacy interests. ... At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may be less than clear whether they suspect with a high degree of certainty that the vehicle contains drugs in a bag or simply contains drugs. If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are actually searching the entire car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish the general probable cause required by Ross.
* * *
To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders rule protects privacy, its protection is minimal. Law enforcement officers may seize a container and hold it until they obtain a search warrant. Chadwick, 433 U.S., at 13. "Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, we can assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases." Sanders, 442 U.S., at 770 (dissenting opinion). And the police often will be able to search containers without a warrant, despite the Chadwick-Sanders rule, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court said:
"[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.
"It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment." Id., at 460 (footnote omitted).
In light of the minimal protection to privacy afforded by the Chadwick-Sanders rule, and our serious doubt whether that rule substantially serves privacy interests, we now hold that the Fourth Amendment does not compel a separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle.
V
* * *
Sanders was explicitly undermined in Ross, 456 U.S., at 824, and the existence of the dual regimes for automobile searches that uncover containers has proved as confusing as the Chadwick and Sanders dissenters predicted. We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.
* * *
In the case before us, the police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the automobile's trunk contained marijuana. That probable cause now allows a warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts in the record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn on such coincidences. We therefore interpret Carroll as providing one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.
The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
1. An interesting inconsistency arises in Acevedo since the container held by Acevedo could not have been searched without a warrant had he walked down the street instead of getting in his automobile. Should the Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in a container depend on whether one is in an automobile or merely walking on the public street? Is there a logical distinction between the expectation of privacy while walking and driving a motor vehicle? Should there be a distinction?
2. Police may search any container within a motor vehicle without a warrant provided probable cause exists to search the automobile for objects which police reasonably believe could be within the container.
Limited Vehicle Searches without Probable Cause
MICHIGAN v. SITZ, Supreme Court of the United States, (1990), 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481
FACTS:
The Michigan State Police initiated a highway sobriety program where the police were to set up roadblocks at selected sites throughout the state. At each checkpoint, police would stop all vehicles and briefly examine the drivers for signs of intoxication. If a given motorist exhibited signs of alcohol or drug use, the officer would motion the driver to a location outside of the usual traffic flow for a check of the operator's permit and vehicle registration, and, if required, additional tests for intoxication. If the motorist appeared to be impaired, the officer was to make an arrest for driving under the influence.
The initial stop of the vehicle was to be made without any probable cause or any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity by the specific driver. The officers were required to inspect each driver and not to use any random selection standard.
A day prior to the beginning of the police program, Sitz and others filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Wayne County seeking an injunction against the use of the checkpoints. At the trial on the merits, the court ruled that the police checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment and the relevant sections of the state constitution. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision by holding that the program violated the Fourth Amendment, but did not consider whether the Michigan State constitution was violated. The Michigan Supreme Court declined to hear the government's appeal and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
PROCEDURAL QUESTION:
Where police set up a roadblock to check all drivers for sobriety where there is no individual probable cause or reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity, does such practice violate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment?
HELD: No.
RATIONALE:
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
* * *
Petitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11; see Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 556 ("It is agreed that checkpoint stops are `seizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. , (1989) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurs "when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied" (emphasis in original)). The question thus becomes whether such seizures are "reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
* * *
No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion. The anecdotal is confirmed by the statistical. "Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage." 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 10.8(d), p. 71 (2d ed. 1987). . . .
Conversely, the weight bearing on the other scale - the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at the sobriety checkpoint - is slight. We reached a similar conclusion as to the intrusion on motorists subjected to a brief stop at a highway checkpoint for detecting illegal aliens. See Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 558. We see virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two types of checkpoints, which to the average motorist would seem identical save for the nature of the questions the checkpoint officers might ask. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus, accurately gauged the "objective" intrusion, measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation, as minimal. See 170 Mich.App., at 444, 429 N. W. 2d, at 184.
With respect to what it perceived to be the "subjective" intrusion on motorists however, the Court of Appeals found such intrusion substantial. See, supra, at . The court first affirmed the trial court's finding that the guidelines governing checkpoint operation minimize the discretion of the officers on the scene. But the court also agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the checkpoints have the potential to generate fear and surprise in motorists. This was so because the record failed to demonstrate that approaching motorists would be aware of their option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid te checkpoints. On that basis, the court deemed the subjective intrusion from the checkpoints unreasonable. Id., at 443-444, 429 N.W. 2d, at 184-185.
We believe the Michigan courts misread our cases concerning the degree of "subjective intrusion" and the potential for generating fear and surprise. The "fear and surprise" to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law abiding motorists by the nature of the stop. This was made clear in Martinez-Fuerte. Comparing checkpoint stops to roving patrol stops considered in prior cases, we said,
"[W]e view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion - the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers - is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In [United States v.] Ortiz, [422 U.S. 891 (1975),] we noted:
"`[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. 422 U.S., at 894-895." Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S., at 558. See also id, at 559. Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to the guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle. The intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.'"
* * *
In sum, the balancing of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program. We therefore hold that it is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
Today, the Court rejects a Fourth Amendment challenge to a sobriety checkpoint policy in which police stop all cars and inspect all drivers for signs of intoxication without any individualized suspicion that a specific driver is intoxicated. The Court does so by balancing "the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped." Ante, at 9. For the reason stated by JUSTICE STEVENS in Parts I and II of his dissenting opinion, I agree that the Court misapplies that test by undervaluing the nature of the intrusion and exaggerating the law enforcement need to use the roadblocks to prevent drunken driving. See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). I write separately to express a few additional points.
The majority opinion creates the impression that the Court generally engages in a balancing test in order to determine the constitutionality of all seizures, or at least those "dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways." Ante, at 4. This is not the case. In most cases, the police must possess probable cause for a seizure to be judged reasonable. See Dunaway v. New York 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979). Only when a seizure is "substantially less intrusive" id., at 210, than a typical arrest is the general rule replaced by a balancing test. I agree with the Court that the initial stop of a car at a roadblock under the Michigan State Police sobriety checkpoint policy is sufficiently less intrusive than an arrest so that the reasonableness of the seizure may be judged, not by the presence of probable cause, but by balancing "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with the individual liberty." Brown v. Texas 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). But one searches the majority opinion in vain for any acknowledgment that the reason for employing the balancing test is that the seizure is minimally intrusive.
Notes
1. The dissenters accuse the majority of introducing a balancing test as the basis to decide whether police conduct fails to meet the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment is silent concerning balancing the need for searches against the rights of the people to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), supra, the Court used a balancing test to determine whether drug tests without probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment.
2. Note that the Michigan plan contemplated stopping all drivers. Such a procedure avoids the vice condemned in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1978), where a police officer randomly singled out motorists for no discernible reason for a driver's license check. The officer possessed neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Prouse or his automobile offended the law. The Court invalidated the conviction of Mr. Prouse on drug related charges due to the illegal stop and search.