This case reconsiders the Miranda principles in light of a new challenge, seeking to overeturn the Miranda decision.
Dickerson v. United States, No. 99-5525
___ U.S. ___ (2000)
Argued April 19, 2000
Decided June 26, 2000
FACTS:
Subsequent to Miranda v. Arizona, law enforcement officials were required to read to persons in custody warnings against self-incrimination and to advise concerning the availability of the right to counsel. A breach of the warning process followed by incriminating statements resulted in the voluntary statements being excluded for proof of guilt in state and federal criminal trials. Displeased with the Miranda warning requirement, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501 which in essence made the admissibility of statements taken in violation of the Miranda warnings turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily.
Dickerson, under indictment for bank robbery and allied crimes, filed a petition to suppress statements he made following non-Mirandized interrogation. The trial court granted his motion, and the prosecution appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. In reversing, the trial court, the Fourth Circuit conceded that petitioner had not received proper Miranda warnings, but held that Sec. 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary and not the product of duress. It concluded that Miranda was not a constitutionally required holding, and that Congress could by statute have the final say on the admissibility question by overruling the Supreme Court by statutory law.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Was the original Miranda v. Arizona decision required by the United States Constitution and, therefore, not susceptible of being overturned by legislation passed by the United States Congress?
HELD: Yes
RATIONALE:
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
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In Miranda, we noted that the advent of modern custodial police interrogation brought with it an increased concern about confessions obtained by coercion. Because custodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual, we stated that,
[e]ven without employing brutality, the "third degree" or [other] specific stratagems, . . . custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. Id. at 455.
We concluded that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be "accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment . . . not to be compelled to incriminate himself." Id. at 439. Accordingly, we laid down "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Id. at 442. Those guidelines established that the admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four warnings. These warnings (which have come to be known colloquially as "Miranda rights") are:
a suspect has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Id. at 479.
Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted Sec. 3501. That section provides, in relevant part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
Given Sec. 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals thatCongress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda. . . . . Because of the obvious conflict between our decision in Miranda and Sec. 3501, we must address whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede Miranda. If Congress has such authority, Sec. 3501's "totality of the circumstances" approach must prevail over Miranda's requirement of warnings; if not, that section must yield to Miranda's more specific requirements.
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Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. This case therefore turns on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction. Recognizing this point, the Court of Appeals surveyed Miranda and its progeny to determine the constitutional status of the Miranda decision. 166 F.3d at 687-692. Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda's warnings requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic," New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984), and "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution," Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974),{2} the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections announced in Miranda are not constitutionally required.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, although we concede that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by that court. But first and foremost of the factors on the other side -- that Miranda is a constitutional decision -- is that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts -- to wit, Arizona, California, and New York. Since that time, we have consistently applied Miranda's rule to prosecutions arising in state courts. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (per curiam); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-482 (1981). It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States.
The Miranda opinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari to explore some facets of the problems . . . of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow. 384 U.S. at 441-442 (emphasis added).
In fact, the majority opinion is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule. Indeed, the Court's ultimate conclusion was that the unwarned confessions obtained in the four cases before the Court in Miranda "were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege."
Additional support for our conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is found in the Miranda Court's invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination. After discussing the "compelling pressures" inherent in custodial police interrogation, the Miranda Court concluded that, [i]n order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequatelyand effectively appraised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
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The Court of Appeals also relied on the fact that we have, after our Miranda decision, made exceptions from its rule in cases such as New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See 166 F.3d at 672, 689-691. But we have also broadened the application of the Miranda doctrine in cases such as Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). These decisions illustrate the principle -- not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule -- but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.
[The Court noted that it might not decide the Miranda case the same way as it originally did, but that the principle of stare decisis mitigates against overruling Miranda now. The Court noted that a deviation from an established line of cases requires a special justification, which did not exist in this case.]
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We do not think there is such justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-332 (1999) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (stating that the fact that a rule has found "`wide acceptance in the legal culture'" is "adequate reason not to overrule" it). While we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, see, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), we do not believe that this has happened to the Miranda decision. If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief.
The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his "rights," may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result. But experience suggests that the "totality of the circumstances" test which Sec. 3501 seeks to revive is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. at 515 ("The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw"). The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry. But, as we said in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984),
[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self- incriminating statement was "compelled" despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare. Id. at 433, n. 20.
In sum, we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting.
Those to whom judicial decisions are an unconnected series of judgments that produce either favored or disfavored results will doubtless greet today's decision as a paragon of moderation, since it declines to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Those who understand the judicial process will appreciate that today's decision is not a reaffirmation of Miranda, but a radical revision of the most significant element of Miranda (as of all cases): the rationale that gives it a permanent place in our jurisprudence.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), held that an Act of Congress will not be enforced by the courts if what it prescribes violates the Constitution of the United States. That was the basis on which Miranda was decided. One will search today's opinion in vain, however, for a statement (surely simple enough to make) that what 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501 prescribes -- the use at trial of a voluntary confession, even when a Miranda warning or its equivalent has failed to be given -- violates the Constitution. The reason the statement does not appear is not only (and perhaps not so much) that it would be absurd, inasmuch as Sec. 3501 excludes from trial precisely what the Constitution excludes from trial, viz., compelled confessions; but also that Justices whose votes are needed to compose today's majority are on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution. [Citations omitted.] And so, to justify today's agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significant new, if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law. As the Court chooses to describe that principle, statutes of Congress can be disregarded, not only when what they prescribe violates the Constitution, but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision of this Court that "announced a constitutional rule," ante at ___. As I shall discuss in some detail, the only thing that can possibly mean in the context of this case is that this Court has the power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful "prophylactic" restrictions upon Congress and the States. That is an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist.