Suppression of Illegally Seized Evidence under Mapp v. Ohio.
An edited version of the Mapp case has been printed below; scroll down to find it.
Suppression of Illegally Seized Evidence
Where the government has illegally seized evidence, the aggrieved party may file a motion to suppress the evidence from introduction in court against that party or person. The usual procedure which the wronged party follows involves the filing of a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence with a request to have the property returned to the defendant. A hearing will be held to determine whether the defendant has a legal basis to complain about a violation of Fourth Amendment Rights and whether, under the circumstances, the government violated the personal rights of the defendant. If the judge agrees with the defendant, the evidence will be ruled inadmissible and where the judge believes that no violation occurred, the evidence will be admissible unless excluded by the substantive rules of evidence.
Although, the literal language of the Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by governmental agents, once a violation has occurred, there is no way to undo the wrong. The defendant cannot be restored to the status quo prior to the search. Since the Fourth Amendment is not self-enforcing and its text fails to provide any remedy for a governmental violation, the remedy mentioned above is the proper procedure to pursue. Cases decided prior to 1914 never addressed concerns related to a remedy because the evidence illegally seized was frequently excluded on other constitutional grounds. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court adopted the current practice of excluding illegally seized evidence from use at federal trials to prove guilt.
Basis for the Exclusionary Rule
The philosophy underpinning the exclusionary rule is predicated on the belief that if the courts were to permit the use of illegally seized evidence, the courts would be condoning the illegality, and perhaps even becoming indirect participants, of Fourth Amendment transgressions. In order to maintain judicial propriety, courts should not sanction Fourth Amendment illegality by allowing prosecutors to introduce the fruits of illegal searches. In addition, by removing the incentive for law enforcement officials to violate the Amendment, the exclusionary rule encouraged respect for the Fourth Amendment.
Although the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule clearly apply to limit federal criminal practice, the same cannot be said for searches and seizures occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. According to the Court, there is no evidence that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment intended it to have extraterritorial effect or to be applied to foreign nationals or their property when located in foreign territory. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
MAPP v. OHIO
Supreme Court of the United States (1961)
367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684
FACTS:
The appellant, Dollree Mapp was convicted of knowingly having in her possession and under her control some lewdand lascivious books, pictures, and photographs in violation of an Ohio statute. The evidence, which aided in her conviction, was taken by police officers, and as the Ohio Supreme Court admitted, was secured during the executionof an illegal search and seizure.
Appellant Mapp lived alone with her fifteen-year-old daughter in a second floor apartment in Cleveland. In the early afternoon of May 23, 1957, three policemen arrived at the home, rang the doorbell, and were asked the purpose of their visit. The police officers stated that they wanted to talk to her and that they would not disclose to her the topic of their inquiry while they remained on the street. In reality, the police had information that a person who had been involved in a recent bombing was present in the home and that there was a large amount of gambling paraphernalia stored within.
Upon consultation with an attorney Ms. Mapp informed the police that she would admit them only if they produced a search warrant. The officers did not force an entry, but kept the home under observation for the next three hours.
Later, with the addition of several more officers, the police attempted and effectuated an entry by breaking the glass to a rear door. When the appellant asked to see a search warrant, an officer waved a piece of paper, purporting to be a search warrant. Ms. Mapp promptly grabbed the paper and placed it to her bosom for safekeeping. The officers, after a brief physical struggle, retrieved it, handcuffed her, and took her upstairs where she was forced to sit on her own bed. The arrival of Mapp's attorney did noting to aid the situation since the police would not allow him to enter the home.
The officers searched through her dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet, and other areas of the bedroom. A photo album and personal papers were also
searched. The search continued through the rest of the second floor, including the other bedroom, the kitchen, and dinette. A search of the basement revealed a trunk which contained the obscene materials upon which this conviction rested.
At Ms. Mapp's trial, the prosecution introduced no evidence of a search warrant and the judge permitted the introduction of the evidence secured by the search. Ms. Mapp was convicted by virtue of the evidence seized from her home.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction with the rationale that the evidence had not been taken from her person by the use of brutal or offensive physical force sufficient to offend a sense of justice.
LEGAL QUESTION PRESENTED:
Should the Exclusionary Rule of Weeks v. United States be extended so as to exclude illegally seized evidence from use to prove guilt in state criminal trials?
HOW THE COURT ANSWERED THE QUESTION: Yes.
THE COURT'S RATIONALE:
Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
* * *
[I]n Weeks v. United States, (1914) 232 U.S. 383, at pages 391-392, 34 S.Ct. 341, at page 344, 58 L.Ed. 652, [the Court] stated that:
"The Fourth Amendment . . . put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restrains [and] . . . forever secure[d] the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law . . . and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under out Federal system with the enforcement of the laws."
Specifically dealing with the use of the evidence unconstitutionally seized, the Court concluded:
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. . ."
Finally, the Court in that case clearly stated that the use of the seized evidence involved "a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused."
* * *
This Court has ever since required of federal law officers a strict adherence to that command which this Court has held to be a clear, specific,
and constitutionally required - even if judicially implied - deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to "a form of words." (Citations omitted.)
* * *
In 1949, . . . this Court, in Wolf v. Colorado (citations omitted), . . . [considered] the effect of the Fourth Amendment upon the States through the operation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It said:
"[W]e have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion to privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Citations omitted.)
* * *
[The Supreme Court in Wolf declined to apply the Weeks Exclusionary Rule to state criminal prosecutions involving violation of Fourth Amendment principles.]
* * *
The Court in Wolf first stated that "[t]he contrariety of views of the States" on the adoption of the exclusionary rule of Weeks was "particularly impressive" (citations omitted); and, in this connection, that it could not "brush aside the experience of the States which deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy . . . by overriding the [States'] relevant rules of evidence." (Citations omitted.) . . . [P]rior to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now despite the Wolf case, more than half of those since passing upon it . . . have . . . adopted or adhere to the Weeks rule. (Citations omitted.) Significantly, among those now following the rule is California, which, according to its highest court, was "compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provision . . . ." People v. Cahan, 1955, 44 Cal.2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911, 50 A.L.R.2d 513. In connection with this California case, we note that the second basis elaborated in Wolf in support of its failure to enforce the exclusionary rule against the States was that "other means of protection" have been afforded the right of privacy (partially protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments). 338 U.S., at page 30, 69 S.Ct. at page 1362. The experience of California that other remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States.
* * *
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause . . ., it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be a "form of words," valueless and undeserving of mention.
* * *
There are those who say . . . that under the exclusionary doctrine "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." (Citations omitted.) In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result. (Footnote omitted.)
* * *
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the character of its own existence.
* * *
Having once recognized that the right of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions by state officers, is therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.. . . [W]e can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision . . . gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.