Illinois v. Wardlow
Supreme Court of the United States
___ U.S.___ (2000).
FACTS:
Defendant Sam Wardlow had been convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, at a bench trial in Cook County, Illinois. He appealed his two year sentence on the basis that the trial court should have excluded the evidence against him and not have entered a verdict of guilt..
The police officers who arrested Wardlow, were among eight officers in four cars traveling in Chicago with the purpose of investigating narcotics sales. One officer stated that he was working in uniform, but did not recall whether the police car he drove, the last in the "caravan," was marked or unmarked. The officers had spotted Wardlow standing on the street in front of a building and did not appear to be violating any law. As the officers' car got closer to Wardlow, he appeared to look in their direction and then "ran southbound through a gangway and then through an alley. Officer Nolan stated that defendant, who was carrying a white opaque bag under his arm, was cornered after they had alighted from their cruiser in an effort to intercept his path of flight. The police also observed Wardlow carrying a white opaque bag under his arm, but its contents were not visible.
Following the stop of Wardlow, an officer conducted a frisk of his person and "fluffed" the opaque bag by squeezing it. From the feel of the bag, the officer believed that a weapon was secreted inside the bag, so the officer opened the bag and revealed a .38 caliber handgun which was loaded. The officers immediately arrested Wardlow on an illegal weapons charge.
Wardlow contended, unsuccessfully in the trial court, that the stop and frisk was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence should not have been introduced against him at his bench trial. He contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his presence in a high-crime area and flight from police were insufficient to justify his investigatory stop and the subsequent frisk.
The intermediate appellate court in Illinois reversed the conviction, holding, among other things, that unprovoked flight is insufficient to justify a stop and frisk under the circumstances. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court result and held that Wardlow gave no outward indication of involvement in illicit activity prior to the approach of the police vehicle. The Court noted that Wardlow was simply standing in front of a building when the officers drove by. Since the Court majority held that the police were not able to point to specific facts corroborating the inference of guilt gleaned from Wardlow's flight, the police stop, frisk and subsequent arrest of Wardlow were in conflict with the Fourth Amendment. The appellate reversal of the trial court's conviction was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider the contentions of the State of Illinois that the stop and frisk of Wardlow were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE:
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, is an individual's flight upon the approach of a police vehicle patrolling a high-crime narcotics area sufficient to justify an investigative stop of the person?
HELD:
Yes.
RATIONALE:
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
* * *
This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer on a public street, is governed by the analysis we first applied in Terry. In Terry, we held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, supra, at While "reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The officer must be able to articulate more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch'" of criminal activity. Terry, supra, at 27.
Nolan and Harvey were among eight officers in a four car caravan that was converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, and the officers anticipated encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug customers and individuals serving as lookouts. App. 8. It was in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him flee. An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a "high crime area" among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 and 147-148 (1972).
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent's presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers' suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight -- wherever it occurs -- is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. . . . .
Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), where we held that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Id. at 498. And any "refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not "going about one's business"; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.
Respondent and amici also argue that there are innocent reasons for flight from police, and that therefore flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment. . . . .
In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way. But in this case, the officers found respondent in possession of a handgun, and arrested him for violation of an Illinois firearms statute. No question of the propriety of the arrest itself is before us.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.